Germany's responsibility in WW1

RandomRodent said:

In some ways that is true except for massive cruiser gap vis-a-vis the rest of the world that would have made commerce protection very interesting. Still for reasons I have pointed out above and also the invention of light armoured cruiser or more commonly called light cruiser I have not particularly explored it had gotten easier.

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The thing that makes the British so hard to beat at this time is their combination of "obsolete" depth and new construction on the way. It's hard to see a scenario where the British are ever in worst shape coming out of a battle than their opponent at this time. For example at Jutland if both fleets had been 100% destroyed by a tsunami Germany would actually have lost ground because Britains worst units were much better and they had more servicable units held back and there were more new units under construction. Britains reserves obsolense would also have been undone because all the ships that made those units obsolete would be gone.


The British and Germans were the only ones with light cruisers at this stage in the game. They also had gigantic merchant fleets.

RandomRodent said:

I am going to take a slightly different line.

The problem is that Wilhelm did try and address British concerns. Only he chose to do so personally, with an interview with the Daily Telegraph. It might be safe to say that it...did not go well. Worse if, as some historians have argued, it caused Wilhelm to withdraw from his previously more active role in government he left Germany in the hands of folks who managed to be if anything less adroit. Which is saying something.

Now to understand the dynamics of the two power standard the Admiralty basically was used to a blank cheque from Parliament, the standard ensured that would continue. Now professional planning in the period (and to be honest in modern times) usually worked by identifying a not unreasonable enemy and building and basing to able to beat them. For most folks this enemy was either your local rival or the Royal Navy. For the Royal Navy it varied as no one power was typically close enough to make for a real threat since France dropped out of a serious race in the 1860s. What made the German dynamic was the doctrinal decision to make it an offensive force aimed at the British rather than the more usual deterrent designed to bleed the RN of blood and ships should they try and interfere in another nation's policy aspirations.

This hugely altered the way the Royal Navy did things, it went from a global police force with most of its ships abroad to an intense focus upon defence of home waters. Yet at the Admiralty it is hard to say how seriously they took Germany, it is not like the signal "Friends today, Friends forever!" indicated a service that thought war inevitable.

Now as to Dreadnought I tend to a different interpretation. When preparatory work for her construction commenced the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron was still a thing. By the time her keel was laid down it was not. Still this left several navies with nominally at least half as many battleships as the British. Further but based on British formulas the number of First Class cruisers was inadequate according to Royal Navy formulas and this still included unsatisfactory ships like the Orlando Class. With the arrival of Dreadnought and the first of the intended new generation of first class cruiser Invincible the Royal Navy found itself leaping ahead.

Now I am going to admit I too grew up on the common narrative of the idea of a reset to zero being bad for the RN but was it? It took a while for anyone to respond and while the pre-dreadnought race had been a little tight with the margin there in battleships but a little shaky in cruisers in the period up to the outbreak of the 1st World War there were only two other powers in the race. As I have mentioned above these were Germany and the USA. Not like in the period when French and Russians had balanced navies and both Germany and the United States had meaningful battlefleets. The issue of cruisers was sort of being addressed by the fact that while the number of battlecruisers was shaping up to be even more below Imperial commerce defence and heavy fleet scouting than the supply of armoured cruisers the powers that had battlecruisers were not actually the ones that also had the best armoured cruiser fleets....also Japan was a firm British ally and Russia was both yet to get in on the battlecruiser act and also, at least technically, an ally. Well sort of, entente partner anyway.

Britain was able to comfortably keep up with its two power goal while only actually having to expect to compete with one of them.

But for the latter part of your question @SSDD I would say no one would have blinked if Germany had built battleships. It would make sense for them to have some. The areas Germany would expect to cover would be the Baltic to blockade Russia and the northern entrance to the North Sea to prevent blockade by France. Cruisers for Imperial defence work and to keep the French from getting comfy and of course a good chunk more vessels of the rate that Germans called torpedo boats and the British destroyers for fleet screening. However numbers were not so much the issue as a more clearly stated doctrinal shift to regarding France and Russia as the enemy.

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I'm not saying the reset was bad or good for the RN I'm saying it being bad is the only angle which the German navy is ever a threat.

Dreadnought was a revolutionary ship and of course the RN would be better off switching to dreadnoughts. But if you're talking percentages and advantages it briefly reset the board. And that period while the UK was regaining it's lead and the anxiety it produced was all that was needed to get the British into WW1 on the Franco-Russian side.

I could say the Admiralty just used the German phantom navy to get funding they otherwise could not have and it all blew up in their faces but that's much harder to prove.

SSDD said:

True but do note even if German navy remained at 50% of Royal Navy still it would give Germany advantage as German navy was concentrated in its coast but British navy was scattered all over the world.

Defeat of Russian navy by Japan in 1904-05 war must had been an eye-opener for British. Much smaller Japanese fleet with help of army could defeat much bigger Russian navy piecemeal.

Also do note: German naval expansion was not direct cause of British entry into war, it was German invasion of Belgium. Everyone knew Britain was committed to Belgium's neutrality and Germans knew too, so they tried to talk to make British out of such commitment and when it became clear Britain wouldn't, they still went ahead anyway.

A more astute German ruler would try to lure France to attack first. Something like, Austria-Hungary invades Serbia, Germany stays neutral, Russia then attacks Austria-Hungary to protect Serbia, Germany then attacks Russia to defend Austria-Hungary but doesn't attack France, now France either has to remain neutral and break its word with Russia or attack Germany first and appear as aggressive. France most probably would choose to attack Germany anyway giving Germany excuse to declare war on France as well.

What would Britain do? Germans had not attacked Belgium so no question of violating Belgium's neutrality. The Germans didn't start war with France either but France started it. So no 1875 either. They would probably still declare war but sometime later but it wouldn't find much public support.

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The Belgium point is entirely dependent on if you think the British would join the war without Germanys naval buildup. Technically Belgium was the reason and if you stand your ground saying they'd honor that treaty there's nothing I can really say to debunk that. But I do not think that is the case. They could have just taken Germanys colonies, they could have retaliated without propping up the Franco-Russian alliance that a decade before was their primary foil. The British didn't have to go to France even if they declared war. They could have taken Germanys colonial empire put the blockade on and saved hundreds of thousands of their own servicememebers lives leaving Franco-Russia to their own devices. WW1 could have been much easier for the British for a country that refused to formally enter alliances they were very good partners and made tangible sacrifices on those partners behalf they did not have to. In any case my question is in 1905 if war breaks out between France/Russia and Germany/Austria-Hungary the same way do the British get involved on the France/Russia side despite their main concern being France/Russia. I can't see that. They could come up with a diplomatic solution to guareentee Belgian neutrality after the war as well.

Issue with the "splitting the forces line" is the British weren't forced to send anything they needed outside of Europe. Given they'd stayed ahead of the naval curve every step of the industrial revolution they had a whole treasure chest of battleships and cruisers that were obsolete for front line combat but could do anything else. They even had battleship gunned monitors to chase a solitary light cruiser up a river in Africa. Even when the British sent battlecruisers to deal with Spee they were sending their worst battlecruisers that should have been retired from front line service as Jutland showed. As Britain kept constructing new vessels the caliber of their reserve units got better and better. During WW1 vessels the worst vessels in the RNs battle fleet(base dreadnoughts) could fight Germanys best. Whereas Germany was forced to drag the Duetschalands into battle at Jutland the comparable British vessels were nowhere near front line service and could be sent anywhere to do anything. Convoy protection, shore bombardment, hunting Goeben in the Black Sea anything. They were putting battleship guns on submarines.

Russia-Japan are entirely different situations.

A the British could blockade Germany at will while hunting all enemy units which is not a hypothetical that's exactly what they did.

B Japan and Russias ships were more or less comparable Russia and Germanys were not and the margin was not as severe. Absent mishandled ammo and weak armor German ships weren't strong enough to sink their British counterparts(especially quickly which was imperative) and execute the strategy attempted at Jutland. If Germany could isolate and destroy British pocket groups like they tried doing at Jutland they'd have to do it 5-6 times while taking next to no losses. While technically possible in practice that was practically impossible and even then the British could replace their losses with better ships right out of the shipyard.

During WW1 Germanys new 15 inch armed Bayern class were seen to be marginally more effective than their British counterparts. Issue was there were 2 of them and they were the only superdreadnoughts the Imperial German navy ever finished. The British completed about 32 superdreadnoughts and their comparable battlecruisers. The British also commandeered 3 more superdreadnoughts from the Ottomans and Chile which is more than the Germans ever completed.

C Russias fleet was split 3 ways across the globe the British needed to make a mistake for their fleet to be split up and allow the Germans to successfully implement their plan. If meaningful sections of the British fleet were split by accident it'd be by a few hours not a few months. Germans were looking at more of a hit and run operation with ships not strong enough to execute a hit and run operation. Once Germany found themselves blockaded they had no choice but to give it a college try but they were not capable of succeeding in their mission. Hence why most German surface construction other than U-Boats was cancelled unless it was near completion.


Germany had the European map they wanted post 1870 and were trying to preserve that status quo. France was the change agent who were trying to affirmatevly shake up the map. France was the only great power Germany had bad relations with into the 1890s. France recruited Russia with capital, the British got scared of Germanys navy and then they had the leverage to get Italy involved. Germany had to fight France because she was tied to Russia and avoid a two front war. There was nothing in it for Germany except breaking up Frances alliance at least not worth the risk. Sure in any war the winners can think of border provinces to seize but there was nothing like that for Germany worth risking the status quo. Brest-Litovsk had a very different dynamic as Germany was cracking under British blockade and they needed resources.

SSDD said:

Defeat of Russian navy by Japan in 1904-05 war must had been an eye-opener for British. Much smaller Japanese fleet with help of army could defeat much bigger Russian navy piecemeal.

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I think the biggest eye opener was that the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron actually stayed afloat long enough to be sunk by the Japanese. The British had encountered them in the North Sea where they almost started a war by opening fire on British trawlers. Even against unarmed ships they still took casualties due to friendly fire. They were that bad and the rest of the voyage was not a whole lot better.

The bigger impact was probably the inspiration it gave Indian nationalists who at last had a solid modern win by Asians over Europeans they could point to. For the Royal Navy itself it was mostly a sense of smug satisfaction as they had been heavily involved in Japanese training and doctrine and had embedded observers in the IJN throughout the conflict.

SSDD said:

What would Britain do? Germans had not attacked Belgium so no question of violating Belgium's neutrality. The Germans didn't start war with France either but France started it. So no 1875 either. They would probably still declare war but sometime later but it wouldn't find much public support.

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I think the question of public support is key. All of the nations under discussion had internal dynamics, Britain, Germany et al. The British regime most likely would still have gone to war given that Germany was seen as such a threat but without a good founding narrative the war might have become deeply unpopular with the public once the body counts were published. It is often forgotten that the German establishment were aware they were losing the war by December of 1916 from reviewing the home front and public perception. Countries have huge inertia so it took a while before Germany was on its knees but the writing was on the wall for some time.

I think what we see though is that German Imperial Army and the Imperial Navy were following different foreign policies from each and both of them were pursuing different agendas to the one espoused by the actual Reich Foreign Ministry. It was this permanent confusion that makes the Kaiserreich seem so bizarre to every outsider who does not have a fetish for jack boots and quite a few of those that do, it also tends to puzzle most serious German historians too.

The Army wanted to fight France and Russia by invading Belgium but did not want war with Britain. The Navy wanted to pick a fight with Britain. The Foreign Ministry was willing to entertain an alliance with Britain as soon as the British made sufficient concessions. That would be just the way with Britain but you could pick other examples. The Foreign Ministry would like an alliance with America as soon as they made sufficient concessions. The Navy kept trying to pick a fight with America, at Samoa but lost their ships in a hurricane, at Manilla Bay but eventually were persuaded to back off and over Venezuela in 1904 before realising perhaps it was a bad idea. The Army was like "America who? Oh cowboys and Indians". We could draw up similar references for multiple nations.

To my mind the key point is really the German mobilization plan. Both in terms of how it actually went (since the mobilization plan was what led to the invasion of Belgium, Luxemburg, France) and in terms of how there was a fundamental disconnect that no other country really had.

As far as anyone else is concerned, an order to mobilize is provocative, but it's not the step that results in war. It's a step, but the end result of the Russian or French mobilizations (or Italian etc.) is that you now have an army at war establishment which is concentrated on your territory in places with good telegraph links. It makes you much less vulnerable to a surprise attack (because you can no longer be hit before your forces have mobilized) and basically at that point you can choose to go to war or to avoid it - you are in communication with your armies, and they're under central control for what you think will probably be the very last time before the short war.
The fact that it is also a defensive move means that it's a prudent one to make.

For the German General Staff specifically, the guys who drew up the mobilization timeline, it's so important to beat France inside six weeks that they don't even bother making any plans besides their attempt to rush down France - and, to save a few days, that plan involves invading France and also Belgium. That's not the war plan, that's the mobilization plan - it's imperative to make space for the arriving troops so the first tranches of troops invade Belgium to make space, also to not waste time.

Thing is, they don't seem to have really made that clear to anyone else, including their political superiors. And they don't seem to have taken into account the possibility of other situations; as it stands, if it is advantageous politically for Germany to stand on the defensive and let the enemy attack them first, there is no German mobilization plan to do this. If Russia launched a surprise attack the German war would begin by invading France.
And because their political superiors don't know this, they authorize mobilization on the assumption that it's like everyone else and is the last step before war - when it's not. It's war.

There's sometimes a lot of focus on how the Russians mobilized first, and it's true that they do, but the Russian mobilization plans end with Russian armies on Russian territory. The French plans end with French armies on French territory. The German plans end with German troops on French territory and a wide swath of Belgium occupied.

It's kind of professional negligence, or possibly that grand old Prussian tradition of "independence of the subordinate commander".

Saphroneth said:

As far as anyone else is concerned, an order to mobilize is provocative, but it's not the step that results in war. It's a step, but the end result of the Russian or French mobilizations (or Italian etc.) is that you now have an army at war establishment which is concentrated on your territory in places with good telegraph links

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In the early 20thC contect, Mobilization isn't just a step, but stepping onto a slide called War. Everyone had plans and timetables.

August 18th, 1892
The Franco-Russian Alliance Military Convention
This Convention was not made public until 1918 by the new Soviet Government.

France and Russia, being animated by a common desire to preserve peace, and having no other object than to meet the necessities of a defensive war, provoked by an attack of the forces of the Triple Alliance against either of them, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article 1. If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

Article 2. In case the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of any one of the Powers belonging to it, should be mobilized, France and Russia, at the first news of this event and without previous agreement being necessary, shall mobilize immediately and simultaneously the whole of their forces, and shall transport them as far as possible to their frontiers.

Article 3. The available forces to be employed against Germany shall be, on the part of France, 1,300,000 men, on the part of Russia, 700,000 or 800,000 men.

Article 4

The general staffs of the armies of both countries will concert their efforts in good time to prepare and advance the execution of the measures set out above. They will exchange in peace time any information which comes to their knowledge of the armies of the Triple Alliance. Means and methods of communication will be studied and prepared in advance.


These forces shall engage to the full with such speed that Germany will have to fight simultaneously on the East and on the West.
---------

Prewar planning, when the above was discussed

The source is the "Documents Diplomatiques Français", 1871-1914, 3 ième Série, 1911-1914,Vol VIII (Paris 1935) No. 79.

Minutes of the Discussions In August 1913 between the Russian and French General Staffs.

(and including the full text, with the contemporaneous commentary, or in French "observations", which is in quotation marks.)

In application of para 1, Article 4 of the Military Convention of 17.8.1892, Generals Jilinski, head of the Russian General Staff, and General Joffre, head of French ditto, held several meetings at St Petersburg and Tsarskoe Selo during August 1913.

Also present were Gen. Laguiche, Military Attaché to Russia, Colonel Count Ignatieff, ditto to France, Colonel Berthelot, French Army.

It was agreed that if any changes were made to the previous Convention, the text should be reprinted in full but noting the changes in the text .

(Each article of the text of the Convention is followed by the corresponding commentary)

Text of the Convention.

Preamble

France and Russia, being animated by an equal desire to keep the peace and whose only object is to meet the needs of a defensive war, provoked by an attack of the forces of the Triple Alliance on one or the other, have agreed as follows:

"The two chiefs of the general staffs declared by common agreement that the words "defensive war" do not mean a war conducted defensively. They assert the contrary, that it is absolutely necessary for the French and Russian armies to take vigorous offensives and as far as possible simultaneously, according to the text of Article 3 of the Convention."
...
Article 2
"Same observations as in 1910, 1911 and 1912 but since their parent governments have approved the interpretation of the two chiefs of general staff, it is convenient to set them out as follows. The French and Russian governments having agreed in 1911 and 1912 that German mobilization would oblige Russia and France to mobilize immediately and simultaneously all their forces at the first news of the event and without previous consultation, it would be the same for any act of war by Germany against one or other of the allies. But if Austria or Italy should mobilize partially or even generally, that consultation is indispensable

The underlined phrase has been included to cover the possibility of a sudden attack, before mobilization, to seize some important point."

Article 3

"We still think Germany will direct the major part of her forces against France, leaving only a minimum against Russia. The 1913 Army Law in Germany will have the effect of speeding up mobilization. Thus the Germans can operate longer against France before having to turn to face Russia. Hence the aim of France and Russia attacking simultaneously from both sides. Joffre declared that the French forces will exceed the stated number by two hundred thousand, that most will be on the eastern frontier by the tenth day of mobilization and that operations will begin on the eleventh day, in the morning. Jilinsky declared that his forces would equal or exceed the number stated, that most would be on the frontier by the fifteenth day of mobilization and that operations would immediately follow. By the end of 1914, mobilization would be two days quicker. The conference discussed the main lines of their planned operations and the need for concentration of force. If the German forces in the east are mostly on the left bank of the Vistula then the Russians should bypass East Prussia to the south and head directly to Berlin otherwise to attack the German forces in that province."
---------
How things worked out
July 25 Tsar starts secret Mobilization of over 1 million men

July 30 Public notice of Russian Mobilization announced countrywide

July 31, 1914 Germany demands that Russia stop Mobilization within 24 hours and declares martial law, and closes Border with France and Belgium.

When the Russians did not answer that Ultimatum, Germany DoWs on Russia at 5pm on August 1st

August 2nd, Russia DoW on Germany in the Afternoon, and Russian Patrols move into German Territory, while in the West, Germany occupies Luxembourg

August 3 Germany DoW on France

Going from the 'Conversation' on Article 3, _Operations_ would commence on the 11th and 15th Day after Mobilization, Operations would occur, and from the Conversation on the Preamble--

absolutely necessary for the French and Russian armies to take vigorous offensives

Emperor of Wurttemburg 43 said:

The Belgium point is entirely dependent on if you think the British would join the war without Germanys naval buildup. Technically Belgium was the reason and if you stand your ground saying they'd honor that treaty there's nothing I can really say to debunk that. But I do not think that is the case. They could have just taken Germanys colonies, they could have retaliated without propping up the Franco-Russian alliance that a decade before was their primary foil. The British didn't have to go to France even if they declared war. They could have taken Germanys colonial empire put the blockade on and saved hundreds of thousands of their own servicememebers lives leaving Franco-Russia to their own devices. WW1 could have been much easier for the British for a country that refused to formally enter alliances they were very good partners and made tangible sacrifices on those partners behalf they did not have to. In any case my question is in 1905 if war breaks out between France/Russia and Germany/Austria-Hungary the same way do the British get involved on the France/Russia side despite their main concern being France/Russia. I can't see that. They could come up with a diplomatic solution to guareentee Belgian neutrality after the war as well.

Issue with the "splitting the forces line" is the British weren't forced to send anything they needed outside of Europe. Given they'd stayed ahead of the naval curve every step of the industrial revolution they had a whole treasure chest of battleships and cruisers that were obsolete for front line combat but could do anything else. They even had battleship gunned monitors to chase a solitary light cruiser up a river in Africa. Even when the British sent battlecruisers to deal with Spee they were sending their worst battlecruisers that should have been retired from front line service as Jutland showed. As Britain kept constructing new vessels the caliber of their reserve units got better and better. During WW1 vessels the worst vessels in the RNs battle fleet(base dreadnoughts) could fight Germanys best. Whereas Germany was forced to drag the Duetschalands into battle at Jutland the comparable British vessels were nowhere near front line service and could be sent anywhere to do anything. Convoy protection, shore bombardment, hunting Goeben in the Black Sea anything. They were putting battleship guns on submarines.

Russia-Japan are entirely different situations.

A the British could blockade Germany at will while hunting all enemy units which is not a hypothetical that's exactly what they did.

B Japan and Russias ships were more or less comparable Russia and Germanys were not and the margin was not as severe. Absent mishandled ammo and weak armor German ships weren't strong enough to sink their British counterparts(especially quickly which was imperative) and execute the strategy attempted at Jutland. If Germany could isolate and destroy British pocket groups like they tried doing at Jutland they'd have to do it 5-6 times while taking next to no losses. While technically possible in practice that was practically impossible and even then the British could replace their losses with better ships right out of the shipyard.

During WW1 Germanys new 15 inch armed Bayern class were seen to be marginally more effective than their British counterparts. Issue was there were 2 of them and they were the only superdreadnoughts the Imperial German navy ever finished. The British completed about 32 superdreadnoughts and their comparable battlecruisers. The British also commandeered 3 more superdreadnoughts from the Ottomans and Chile which is more than the Germans ever completed.

C Russias fleet was split 3 ways across the globe the British needed to make a mistake for their fleet to be split up and allow the Germans to successfully implement their plan. If meaningful sections of the British fleet were split by accident it'd be by a few hours not a few months. Germans were looking at more of a hit and run operation with ships not strong enough to execute a hit and run operation. Once Germany found themselves blockaded they had no choice but to give it a college try but they were not capable of succeeding in their mission. Hence why most German surface construction other than U-Boats was cancelled unless it was near completion.


Germany had the European map they wanted post 1870 and were trying to preserve that status quo. France was the change agent who were trying to affirmatevly shake up the map. France was the only great power Germany had bad relations with into the 1890s. France recruited Russia with capital, the British got scared of Germanys navy and then they had the leverage to get Italy involved. Germany had to fight France because she was tied to Russia and avoid a two front war. There was nothing in it for Germany except breaking up Frances alliance at least not worth the risk. Sure in any war the winners can think of border provinces to seize but there was nothing like that for Germany worth risking the status quo. Brest-Litovsk had a very different dynamic as Germany was cracking under British blockade and they needed resources.

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Britain had always reacted to major powers controlling the lowl countries coast. It woudl be serious issue even without the treaty. Enough by itslef dunno.

As for savingthe immesnse cost of WW1/. Well almost evenrone assumed it woudl be relatively short war. If only that they saw the cost of even a short war as being pretty expensive and a long war being ecnomicly unviable. The immesnse costs of ww1 was nt particuallry forseeable, and donlt think you can project that sort of hindsight into British decision making.

The Battlecruisers were not obslete they were doig what hthey were designed and built for. Destroying cruisers and clearing the sea lanes. They were very good at they intended purpose.
Putting them in the battle line was questioable and not what hey were designed for. German battlecruisers were designed for different purposes.

marathag said:

In the early 20thC contect, Mobilization isn't just a step, but stepping onto a slide called War. Everyone had plans and timetables.

August 18th, 1892
The Franco-Russian Alliance Military Convention
This Convention was not made public until 1918 by the new Soviet Government.

France and Russia, being animated by a common desire to preserve peace, and having no other object than to meet the necessities of a defensive war, provoked by an attack of the forces of the Triple Alliance against either of them, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article 1. If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

Article 2. In case the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of any one of the Powers belonging to it, should be mobilized, France and Russia, at the first news of this event and without previous agreement being necessary, shall mobilize immediately and simultaneously the whole of their forces, and shall transport them as far as possible to their frontiers.

Article 3. The available forces to be employed against Germany shall be, on the part of France, 1,300,000 men, on the part of Russia, 700,000 or 800,000 men.

Article 4

The general staffs of the armies of both countries will concert their efforts in good time to prepare and advance the execution of the measures set out above. They will exchange in peace time any information which comes to their knowledge of the armies of the Triple Alliance. Means and methods of communication will be studied and prepared in advance.


These forces shall engage to the full with such speed that Germany will have to fight simultaneously on the East and on the West.
---------

Prewar planning, when the above was discussed

The source is the "Documents Diplomatiques Français", 1871-1914, 3 ième Série, 1911-1914,Vol VIII (Paris 1935) No. 79.

Minutes of the Discussions In August 1913 between the Russian and French General Staffs.

(and including the full text, with the contemporaneous commentary, or in French "observations", which is in quotation marks.)

In application of para 1, Article 4 of the Military Convention of 17.8.1892, Generals Jilinski, head of the Russian General Staff, and General Joffre, head of French ditto, held several meetings at St Petersburg and Tsarskoe Selo during August 1913.

Also present were Gen. Laguiche, Military Attaché to Russia, Colonel Count Ignatieff, ditto to France, Colonel Berthelot, French Army.

It was agreed that if any changes were made to the previous Convention, the text should be reprinted in full but noting the changes in the text .

(Each article of the text of the Convention is followed by the corresponding commentary)

Text of the Convention.

Preamble

France and Russia, being animated by an equal desire to keep the peace and whose only object is to meet the needs of a defensive war, provoked by an attack of the forces of the Triple Alliance on one or the other, have agreed as follows:

"The two chiefs of the general staffs declared by common agreement that the words "defensive war" do not mean a war conducted defensively. They assert the contrary, that it is absolutely necessary for the French and Russian armies to take vigorous offensives and as far as possible simultaneously, according to the text of Article 3 of the Convention."
...
Article 2
"Same observations as in 1910, 1911 and 1912 but since their parent governments have approved the interpretation of the two chiefs of general staff, it is convenient to set them out as follows. The French and Russian governments having agreed in 1911 and 1912 that German mobilization would oblige Russia and France to mobilize immediately and simultaneously all their forces at the first news of the event and without previous consultation, it would be the same for any act of war by Germany against one or other of the allies. But if Austria or Italy should mobilize partially or even generally, that consultation is indispensable

The underlined phrase has been included to cover the possibility of a sudden attack, before mobilization, to seize some important point."

Article 3

"We still think Germany will direct the major part of her forces against France, leaving only a minimum against Russia. The 1913 Army Law in Germany will have the effect of speeding up mobilization. Thus the Germans can operate longer against France before having to turn to face Russia. Hence the aim of France and Russia attacking simultaneously from both sides. Joffre declared that the French forces will exceed the stated number by two hundred thousand, that most will be on the eastern frontier by the tenth day of mobilization and that operations will begin on the eleventh day, in the morning. Jilinsky declared that his forces would equal or exceed the number stated, that most would be on the frontier by the fifteenth day of mobilization and that operations would immediately follow. By the end of 1914, mobilization would be two days quicker. The conference discussed the main lines of their planned operations and the need for concentration of force. If the German forces in the east are mostly on the left bank of the Vistula then the Russians should bypass East Prussia to the south and head directly to Berlin otherwise to attack the German forces in that province."
---------
How things worked out
July 25 Tsar starts secret Mobilization of over 1 million men

July 30 Public notice of Russian Mobilization announced countrywide

July 31, 1914 Germany demands that Russia stop Mobilization within 24 hours and declares martial law, and closes Border with France and Belgium.

When the Russians did not answer that Ultimatum, Germany DoWs on Russia at 5pm on August 1st

August 2nd, Russia DoW on Germany in the Afternoon, and Russian Patrols move into German Territory, while in the West, Germany occupies Luxembourg

August 3 Germany DoW on France

Going from the 'Conversation' on Article 3, _Operations_ would commence on the 11th and 15th Day after Mobilization, Operations would occur, and from the Conversation on the Preamble--

absolutely necessary for the French and Russian armies to take vigorous offensives

Click to expand...

your overlooking the very importnat word IF here.

Article 1. If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.
If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.


IF.

IF Germany attacks then....

context.

RandomRodent said:

I think the biggest eye opener was that the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron actually stayed afloat long enough to be sunk by the Japanese. The British had encountered them in the North Sea where they almost started a war by opening fire on British trawlers. Even against unarmed ships they still took casualties due to friendly fire. They were that bad and the rest of the voyage was not a whole lot better.

The bigger impact was probably the inspiration it gave Indian nationalists who at last had a solid modern win by Asians over Europeans they could point to. For the Royal Navy itself it was mostly a sense of smug satisfaction as they had been heavily involved in Japanese training and doctrine and had embedded observers in the IJN throughout the conflict.


I think the question of public support is key. All of the nations under discussion had internal dynamics, Britain, Germany et al. The British regime most likely would still have gone to war given that Germany was seen as such a threat but without a good founding narrative the war might have become deeply unpopular with the public once the body counts were published. It is often forgotten that the German establishment were aware they were losing the war by December of 1916 from reviewing the home front and public perception. Countries have huge inertia so it took a while before Germany was on its knees but the writing was on the wall for some time.

I think what we see though is that German Imperial Army and the Imperial Navy were following different foreign policies from each and both of them were pursuing different agendas to the one espoused by the actual Reich Foreign Ministry. It was this permanent confusion that makes the Kaiserreich seem so bizarre to every outsider who does not have a fetish for jack boots and quite a few of those that do, it also tends to puzzle most serious German historians too.

The Army wanted to fight France and Russia by invading Belgium but did not want war with Britain. The Navy wanted to pick a fight with Britain. The Foreign Ministry was willing to entertain an alliance with Britain as soon as the British made sufficient concessions. That would be just the way with Britain but you could pick other examples. The Foreign Ministry would like an alliance with America as soon as they made sufficient concessions. The Navy kept trying to pick a fight with America, at Samoa but lost their ships in a hurricane, at Manilla Bay but eventually were persuaded to back off and over Venezuela in 1904 before realising perhaps it was a bad idea. The Army was like "America who? Oh cowboys and Indians". We could draw up similar references for multiple nations.

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In the Kasierrecih , ministers served the Emperor diretcly. Inidvidually at his pleasure. They were not a cabinet., a collective. They were not responsible to Parliment. Nor was the Army.

It was all personally relations to the monarch. The Lack of collective responsibility or decsion making meant mninsters often played their own game with little reference to others.

marathag said:

In the early 20thC contect, Mobilization isn't just a step, but stepping onto a slide called War. Everyone had plans and timetables.

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Yes, everyone had plans and timetables. But everybody else can mobilize their forces and then make the decision on whether to invade.

If what happens in a crisis is that everyone mobilizes, stares at one another over the borders because nobody's vulnerable, and then no war results, then - hurrah, deterrence has worked and the war is averted.

The French mobilization in 1914 doesn't blindly plunge ahead to conduct their planned offensive, because the political situation is such that they can mobilize, pause, and then decide whether or not to execute that plan. The French actually pulled back from the border by 10km (about half a day's march); they are trying to de-escalate while providing themselves the means for defence, which is something they can actually do as their mobilization scheme is based on their war plans but doesn't actually make them mandatory.


The German one is qualitatively different because the mobilization plan includes the invasion. And to my understanding the people at the top (Kaiser for example) don't actually know this. This means that Russian mobilization puts them in a situation of "invade Belgium or lose" and they don't know that's the choice.

Perhaps they thought that was the choice anyway, but by making it the war plan they have removed all doubt.

I really want to stress that point about the German system being qualitatively different, because we can see (like, because it happened) that the French system was actually capable of a system where they mobilized without actually launching their invasion. They have a plan for an offensive because a plan for a defensive is much more reactive - as Wellington said, Napoleon's the one who's going to attack, and how do you expect me to make my plans when he hasn't told me his? - but they don't need to execute that plan. As the armies gather at their mobilization stations they can issue orders to withdraw (as they did) instead of executing their attack plan.

Russia is similar. Their forces take a long time to fully mobilize, but they also have the ability to mobilize parts of their forces much faster precisely because of the danger a long mobilization would cause in the event of a German attack on France; they don't have to invade just because they've mobilized. The Tsar can pass on instructions to hold position and await orders until the point when the armies actually move out of communications, which is going to be a while - even historically it took the French screaming at the Russians to hurry up and a couple of weeks atter the invasion of Belgium for the Russian forces to even reach the East Prussian border.

Germany is different. The Kaiser signs the order for mobilization and a day and a half later is demanding to know what the f*ck is going on and why his armies are invading Belgium instead of moving east. Which suggests that he has no idea that the order he signed was an order to invade Belgium as an integral part of the mobilization, incidentally nullifying the Italian alliance (for which there doesn't seem much bloody point if the whole German strategic scheme is based on pre-empting someone else's mobilization).

If the German mobilization scheme had been put together in a more conventional way you'd have had German armies moving to their concentration points West and East, but not actually crossing borders, and the Kaiser insisting that more of them go east because that's where the actual threat is. As it was the German scheme is the part of the system which allows for someone with the authority to give an order (which will start the war) to not actually know that's what he's doing.

pugsville said:

Britain had always reacted to major powers controlling the lowl countries coast. It woudl be serious issue even without the treaty. Enough by itslef dunno.

As for savingthe immesnse cost of WW1/. Well almost evenrone assumed it woudl be relatively short war. If only that they saw the cost of even a short war as being pretty expensive and a long war being ecnomicly unviable. The immesnse costs of ww1 was nt particuallry forseeable, and donlt think you can project that sort of hindsight into British decision making.

The Battlecruisers were not obslete they were doig what hthey were designed and built for. Destroying cruisers and clearing the sea lanes. They were very good at they intended purpose.
Putting them in the battle line was questioable and not what hey were designed for. German battlecruisers were designed for different purposes.

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It would be but that doesn't mean they'd enter a war over it especially not sending troops into Europe. But yes it's hard to get a conclusive answer to that question.

Stabilizing the western front was the main way WW1 would devolve into a long war and while it might not have been obvious I think that was at least somewhat predictable. I don't see how the British would have reconciled saving the French with the wars swift end.

When I called battlecruisers obsolete I was referring to the I class the very first battlecruisers instead of the type as a whole. These ships had substantially less armor than most other battlecruisers(the Renowns and Courageous class would also be poorly armored) and were uniquely vulnerable as a result. While battlecruisers could do far more roles than dreadnought battleships that was more of a zero sum benefit with a nominal cost whereas battleships slow speed was a cost that came without much of a benefit. Hence why after WW1 dreadnought style battleships stopped being made(USN kept making them a little longer in the name of standardization). During WW1 battlecruisers main weakness was how few of them they were on both sides especially ones without obvious experiemential shortcomings like cruiser armor or 11 inch guns(Going into Jutland the British and Germans had 4 and 2 such battlecruisers respectively).

The other battlecruisers armor wasnt as good as that of their comparable battleships but it was good enough especially against the Germans 11 and 12 inch guns and looking how the German battlecruisers performed against the heavier British gunfire it wouldn't have precluded them from the battleline regardless. The Is were uniquely vulnerable to the lighter capital ship shells like the armored cruisers they were originally the dreadnought equivilants of. Of course the British battlecruisers being built during WW1 were going to share those weakness(though with much stronger guns) hence the Admirals were laid down immediately after Jutland.

Queen Mary and Lion blew up and almost blew up respectively due to negligent ammo handling practices not the design of the ships themselves. Their armor could handle the German shells.

Emperor of Wurttemburg 43 said:

Queen Mary and Lion blew up and almost blew up respectively due to negligent ammo handling practices not the design of the ships themselves. Their armor could handle the German shells.

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I think it's the case that all the battlecruiser explosions or lack thereof result not from armour problems but from cordite handling and specifically the deterioration over time of cordite itself. Lion took a huge number of hits at Jutland and all else being equal should have blown up if she was as vulnerable as the other battlecruisers, but her cordite had been replaced a few months prior (after some cartridges had been filed incorrectly). That lack of aged cordite was something DK Brown considered crucial to the understanding of events, and indeed the speed with which Invincible etc. exploded doesn't really give time for the magazine to be flooded in the way Lion did.


To be sure, without the unique vulnerability of cordite and major doctrinal issues the battlecruisers would still have taken a pounding, and probably lost turrets (though not necessarily ships) in the same way some German battlecruisers did. But this doesn't mean they were flawed designs, or even too old to take part - take away the cordite-driven ammunition explosions and leave the rest of the battle absolutely the same (and all three BCs which blew up instead pounded into half-disarmed wrecks), and you have a perfectly acceptable level of damage. (As the saying goes, ships are safe in port but that's not what they're for.)

Remove the older battlecruisers, on the other hand, and you cut Beatty's possible scouting force by six (three Invincible, three Indefatigable) down to just four, and he ends up quite seriously outgunned by the German battlecruisers - he has to include the fast battleships to have a hope of winning a scouting line clash, and that reduces him to 25 knots. Given that scouting-line clashes are much more the sort of thing you anticipate and every other squadron battle in the war so far had revolved around them, I think keeping the older battlecruisers in the line is a quite reasonable choice.

Just, like... don't functionally rig them to explode.

Saphroneth said:

I think it's the case that all the battlecruiser explosions or lack thereof result not from armour problems but from cordite handling and specifically the deterioration over time of cordite itself. Lion took a huge number of hits at Jutland and all else being equal should have blown up if she was as vulnerable as the other battlecruisers, but her cordite had been replaced a few months prior (after some cartridges had been filed incorrectly). That lack of aged cordite was something DK Brown considered crucial to the understanding of events, and indeed the speed with which Invincible etc. exploded doesn't really give time for the magazine to be flooded in the way Lion did.


To be sure, without the unique vulnerability of cordite and major doctrinal issues the battlecruisers would still have taken a pounding, and probably lost turrets (though not necessarily ships) in the same way some German battlecruisers did. But this doesn't mean they were flawed designs, or even too old to take part - take away the cordite-driven ammunition explosions and leave the rest of the battle absolutely the same (and all three BCs which blew up instead pounded into half-disarmed wrecks), and you have a perfectly acceptable level of damage. (As the saying goes, ships are safe in port but that's not what they're for.)

Remove the older battlecruisers, on the other hand, and you cut Beatty's possible scouting force by six (three Invincible, three Indefatigable) down to just four, and he ends up quite seriously outgunned by the German battlecruisers - he has to include the fast battleships to have a hope of winning a scouting line clash, and that reduces him to 25 knots. Given that scouting-line clashes are much more the sort of thing you anticipate and every other squadron battle in the war so far had revolved around them, I think keeping the older battlecruisers in the line is a quite reasonable choice.

Just, like... don't functionally rig them to explode.

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It is worth noting that aging cordite took out HMS Vanguard in port with no German participation required.

RandomRodent said:

It is worth noting that aging cordite took out HMS Vanguard in port with no German participation required.

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Indeed. The instability problem was known but not the severity, because it wasn't realized the extent to which the confinement of cordite affected its explosive sensitivity in ways that earlier propellants (e.g. gunpowder) simply did not. Confinement of gunpowder increased the force of an explosion, but not the stimulus that could cause it, and since cordite burned instead of exploding in the open it was thought to be safer than it was.

Emperor of Wurttemburg 43 said:

It would be but that doesn't mean they'd enter a war over it especially not sending troops into Europe. But yes it's hard to get a conclusive answer to that question.

Stabilizing the western front was the main way WW1 would devolve into a long war and while it might not have been obvious I think that was at least somewhat predictable. I don't see how the British would have reconciled saving the French with the wars swift end.

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But without Belguim the estern front is shorter , without occupied france there isnt the same iimpulse for the offensve, or large Scale British presence. France industry is not disruped.

Emperor of Wurttemburg 43 said:

When I called battlecruisers obsolete I was referring to the I class the very first battlecruisers instead of the type as a whole. These ships had substantially less armor than most other battlecruisers(the Renowns and Courageous class would also be poorly armored) and were uniquely vulnerable as a result. While battlecruisers could do far more roles than dreadnought battleships that was more of a zero sum benefit with a nominal cost whereas battleships slow speed was a cost that came without much of a benefit. Hence why after WW1 dreadnought style battleships stopped being made(USN kept making them a little longer in the name of standardization). During WW1 battlecruisers main weakness was how few of them they were on both sides especially ones without obvious experiemential shortcomings like cruiser armor or 11 inch guns(Going into Jutland the British and Germans had 4 and 2 such battlecruisers respectively).

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For wiping the seas clean of cruisers their intended role they would far form obsolete ad entirely serviceable and in fact excellent in that role. If start operating them to do things for they were designed. It wa not obsolescence, it was putting something into situation it was clearly noty built for.It;s not like they were meant for the battle line and were now ineffective because of better ships in teh battle line. They were dodgy in battle line when built.IT was that designed aged in time to obslelcne, it just was never designed of that prupose.

Emperor of Wurttemburg 43 said:

The other battlecruisers armor wasnt as good as that of their comparable battleships but it was good enough especially against the Germans 11 and 12 inch guns and looking how the German battlecruisers performed against the heavier British gunfire it wouldn't have precluded them from the battleline regardless. The Is were uniquely vulnerable to the lighter capital ship shells like the armored cruisers they were originally the dreadnought equivilants of. Of course the British battlecruisers being built during WW1 were going to share those weakness(though with much stronger guns) hence the Admirals were laid down immediately after Jutland.

Queen Mary and Lion blew up and almost blew up respectively due to negligent ammo handling practices not the design of the ships themselves. Their armor could handle the German shells.

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I think they were designed to act as the scouting wing (which they did) and fast wing of the battle line in fleet actions. This is because they were basically armoured cruisers upgraded, and armoured cruisers had done much the same thing; their great size makes their loss a greater gut punch, but it's not like the last armoured cruisers were that much smaller. Nobody really mentions the loss of the three armoured cruisers at Jutland; Defence even exploded and with nearly as much loss of life as Invincible.

Saphroneth said:

I think they were designed to act as the scouting wing (which they did) and fast wing of the battle line in fleet actions. This is because they were basically armoured cruisers upgraded, and armoured cruisers had done much the same thing; their great size makes their loss a greater gut punch, but it's not like the last armoured cruisers were that much smaller. Nobody really mentions the loss of the three armoured cruisers at Jutland; Defence even exploded and with nearly as much loss of life as Invincible.

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I was going to mention that that heavy scouting and screening role was part of the doctrine for 1st class cruisers within the Royal Navy and that was exactly how they were being used when destroyed. Beatty lost the Indefatigable and Queen Mary while conducting the scouting mission and Hood's flagship Invincible became caught up in the action after having disabled the light cruiser Wiesbaden as part of her heavy screening role. It is worth mentioning that is strongly suspected that it was hits by the Invincible that ultimately sank the Lützow, yet another battlecruiser sunk while performing her heavy fleet scouting mission.

Mind you naval planners expected warships to get sunk, the question is did they perform their mission effectively?

Edit: another point I am adding in rather than double posting is that all the heavy ships sunk absorbed considerable amounts of fire, Beatty's ships taking some 42 main calibre hits between them on the run south for example. So apart from cordite explosions there is not really the evidence that battlecruisers or indeed armoured cruisers were particular tender.