The Teutonic Knights Myth

Joined Apr 2011
6,626 Posts | 7+
Sarmatia
Last edited:
Reading many posts here and seeing admiration of some members of this forum for Teutonic Knights I decided to start this discussion. Many people here seems to think that Teutonic Knights were great, strong fearless knights who didnt have equal opponents on the battlefields because were so skilled in fighting and killing. Its a myth. Probably young knights who were joining the order were good fighters but soon they were becoming commanders and even more often administrators of their Prussian state. Most of them was rather becoming fat and didnt have time for practicing combat.
A good example is their greatest defeat, the battle of Grunwald/Tannenberg in year 1410. From about 250 Teutonic knights who took part in the battle about 200 were killed. Two (Marquard von Salzbach and Heinrich von Schaumburg) were executed by order of Vytautas after the battle because he was negotiating with them possibility of betraying Polish king and was afraid that when captured they will talk about it.
But only one duel between Polish and Teutonic knights is known and not because Teutonic knight did fight so well but because it was Grand Master of the Order who was killed by (terrible name for English speakers)Mszczuj of Skrzynno.
There was no single epic duel to describe by the chroniclers during the battle in which Teutonic knight was defeated or in which he has defeated Polish knight.

Someone may ask why. There were 3 theories

1. The Knights died at the hands of people outside of knighthood (eg. the peasant infantry);
2.The knights were killed after the battle in violation of the customs of chivalry;
3. The performance of the knigths on the battlefield was much worse than their fame.

1. The theory about significant number of paesant infantry was highly propagated by authorities in communist Poland however today most of the historians agree that there was no such infantry on the battlefield which was mostly horse battle.

2. If Polish side would break chivlary rules to such extent the Knights would be first to point it but no single Teutonic Chronicler has write about it.

3. The last hypothesis is based on the fact that Brothers were considered as excellent warriors and best fencers, which came from their activities at the beginning of the conquest of Prussia, and that later the Teutonic Knights fought incidentally personally (therefore no one can verify this legend ). The knights who were only about 250 people had to manage the whole country which prevented them from frequent and lengthy exercises. During the battle Poles and Lithuanians were still beliving in the story of unparalleled swordsmen and were attacking them showing their best skills. As a result of the attack, which could have been repulsed by a trained knight and which usually wouldnt be deadly, it was mortal to a senior official.
Most of the Teutonic Knights who survived the battle were younger monks, who have not yet received administrative functions.
In this case Polish chroniclers did not want to downplay their victory and omitted in the chronicles descriptions of their duels and deaths.

Teutonic_Knight_A-copy-968x649.jpg


Still+crusades+against+filthy+backward+folk+spreading+heresy+and+whatnot+_07f50a78dfefdc06147a6e75cef9ef69.jpg
 
Joined Mar 2014
8,881 Posts | 30+
Canterbury
The Knights' effectiveness didn't match their Terminator-like image, but wasn't bad. They did, after all, found a state through violent enterprise. And what their record lacked in favourable odds it made up for in sheer brutality, and psychological impact.
 
Joined Oct 2011
40,550 Posts | 7,631+
Italy, Lago Maggiore
Well, Well,

Teutons were knights like others [a knight was a medieval well equipped riding warrior, but this didn't mean that he was at the top ... as for individual skills]. What was remarkable about them was the organization of their Order [with capital "O"] which was able to create a real "state".

I started a thread about Teuton Knights under this light: http://historum.com/medieval-byzantine-history/33723-teuton-knights-succesfully-hybrid.html
 
Joined Nov 2010
14,406 Posts | 4,143+
Cornwall
Like most things they declined. They lost there reason to be when catholicism was spread and it's pretty clear that Tannenberg was the end of that decline. they weren't the force then of 200 years earlier.

There was a programme on last week about some English knights, from Cumbria, who toddled off to crusade with the Teutonic knights and one of them was killed in combat. 14th century I believe. They weren't young, but knights experienced in border fighting with the Scots etc.

Also we have discussed on here about Teutonic knights who were based in Zamora, Spain for a while, doing their bit in that war. Also a unit of knights from what became Spain - one of the orders but I cant remember which (Santiago?) - who did a reciprocal (but unrelated) trip, fighting with the Teutonic knights for a while.

I think you're doing them a bit of a disservice overall!
 
Joined May 2014
247 Posts | 0+
U.S.A.
The Knights' effectiveness didn't match their Terminator-like image, but wasn't bad. They did, after all, found a state through violent enterprise. And what their record lacked in favourable odds it made up for in sheer brutality, and psychological impact.

I think people tend to forget that Medieval armies are led from the front. When things get scary or there is lots of arrow fire that knights shrug off but is devastating to the common levy soldier, they run. If you figure men at arms or fighting gentry who would be considered knights on the field to be 10% of the army which is a generally accepted number, you end up badly outnumbered even when both armies are the same size respectively. Armies that are used to fighting knights then pick them off one by one in a succession of multiple opponents on one usually using polearms to drag him to the ground and deliver a coup de grace. Knights were probably some of the deadliest hand to hand fighters who ever lived on the battlefield. Not pushovers
 
Joined Nov 2010
14,406 Posts | 4,143+
Cornwall
Last edited:
I think people tend to forget that Medieval armies are led from the front. When things get scary or there is lots of arrow fire that knights shrug off but is devastating to the common levy soldier, they run. If you figure men at arms or fighting gentry who would be considered knights on the field to be 10% of the army which is a generally accepted number, you end up badly outnumbered even when both armies are the same size respectively. Armies that are used to fighting knights then pick them off one by one in a succession of multiple opponents on one usually using polearms to drag him to the ground and deliver a coup de grace. Knights were probably some of the deadliest hand to hand fighters who ever lived on the battlefield. Not pushovers

The christian kingdoms of Spain never really got to grips with the African tactic (Almoravids and Almohads) of going against this standard. The old standard was to charge headlong with all your heavy knights and hope to smash through the weaker centre of the enemy and attack their HQ position/leader.

Both Almoravids and Almohads brought the tactic to Spain of leading your main centre with '.....ists' - volunteers usually unarmed except with their faith and very expendable - or, in the case of Sagrajas/Zalaqa with the little-respected Andalusian contingents. This meant that the main shock of the heavy northern knights was absorbed with hardly any combat from the main army. Once the christians got tired hacking away at this fodder, the main centre could engage and large light cavalry forces on either flank simply move forward toward the Christian king, leading to a surrounding, a cut off and a headlong chaotic retreat.

This was only really beatable (to the christians at the time) by a narrow battlefield - like Las Navas 1212 which was a long battle of attrition, or at Bairen 1097 where the armies of El Cid and Pedro I of Aragon smashed through the superior Almoravid army which had them penned in between the sea and the mountains - or by a very clever mind - like El Cid v the Almoravids several times (catching them on the hop).

Another failure of the noble up-and-at-em chivalry habits was the repeated factor of getting caught by the feigned retreat. Much like Apache westerns and much reminiscent of Hattin. one was only doing the right thing if one charged headlong at the enemy - however senseless that may seem to us now.

This happened against the Almoravids at Ucles to the Castillian army of Alvar Fanez and much later to the Castillian contingent under the Infante Sancho, mainly knights of Santiago, destroyed at Moclin by the Granadino forces in 1280 - another unmitigated disaster (2800 dead) almost leading to the extinction of the Order of Santiago, only saved by the transfer of all the knights from the fledgling Order of Santa Maria and the abolition of that order, by Alfonso X.
 
Joined May 2014
247 Posts | 0+
U.S.A.
The christian kingdoms of Spain never really got to grips with the African tactic (Almoravids and Almohads) of going against this standard. The old standard was to charge headlong with all your heavy knights and hope to smash through the weaker centre of the enemy and attack their HQ position/leader.

Both Almoravids and Almohads brought the tactic to Spain of leading your main centre with '.....ists' - volunteers usually unarmed except with their faith and very expendable - or, in the case of Sagrajas/Zalaqa with the little-respected Andalusian contingents. This meant that the main shock of the heavy northern knights was absorbed with hardly any combat from the main army. Once the christians got tired hacking away at this fodder, the main centre could engage and large light cavalry forces on either flank simply move forward toward the Christian king, leading to a surrounding, a cut off and a headlong chaotic retreat.

This was only really beatable (to the christians at the time) by a narrow battlefield - like Las Navas 1212 which was a long battle of attrition, or at Bairen 1097 where the armies of El Cid and Pedro I of Aragon smashed through the superior Almoravid army which had them penned in between the sea and the mountains - or by a very clever mind - like El Cid v the Almoravids several times (catching them on the hop).

Another failure of the noble up-and-at-em chivalry habits was the repeated factor of getting caught by the feigned retreat. Much like Apache westerns and much reminiscent of Hattin. one was only doing the right thing if one charged headlong at the enemy - however senseless that may seem to us now.

This happened against the Almoravids at Ucles to the Castillian army of Alvar Fanez and much later to the Castillian contingent under the Infante Sancho, mainly knights of Santiago, destroyed at Moclin by the Granadino forces in 1280 - another unmitigated disaster (2800 dead) almost leading to the extinction of the Order of Santiago, only saved by the transfer of all the knights from the fledgling Order of Santa Maria and the abolition of that order, by Alfonso X.

I like to call those knightly tactics you mentioned the "Frankish" charge. Alot of these non western armies realized it was suicide to go toe to toe with the knights, but the often peasant levies that supported them were another matter. When the 15th century came around and you saw more combined forces and knights dismounting to form a solid front line that bolstered the lesser soldiers and made them less vulnerable to missles and charges. Islamic fortunes in spain also reversed. Ironically those same Granadino forces you mentioned fought in a very western way- when compared to Turks or Saracens farther east. In the 13th century and before there would be little distinguishing Spanish nobles and Granadino nobles as they would both be chain mailed, lance armed heavy cavaly. In the case of spain in that age it was a case of their enemies having all their advantages as well as a more varied and usually better led force overall.
 
Joined Oct 2011
40,550 Posts | 7,631+
Italy, Lago Maggiore
Historically the religious knight orders have been a kind of parenthesis. Even if theoretically some of them still could fight [Malta Knights and Teutonic Knights are still organized in knight orders embedded in Catholic Church, btw ... the "original", this point is to be clarified, Teutonic Order is still there, it's part of Catholic clergy with more than 1,000 members, counting about 100 priests and 200 nuns], today they deal with charity and similar activities.

The Teutonic Order had something particular, which give "nutrition" to the myth: they run crusaders against Pagans in North East Europe, they created real states and they attracted European aristocracy and knights with their "Reisen" ... real little crusades by invitation [they invited knights from all over the Europe to join them for these seasonal wars against the Pagans and some of the guests deserved the honor to seat at the high table with the GrandMaster].

So, sure it was something particular.
 
Joined Nov 2010
14,406 Posts | 4,143+
Cornwall
I like to call those knightly tactics you mentioned the "Frankish" charge. Alot of these non western armies realized it was suicide to go toe to toe with the knights, but the often peasant levies that supported them were another matter. When the 15th century came around and you saw more combined forces and knights dismounting to form a solid front line that bolstered the lesser soldiers and made them less vulnerable to missles and charges. Islamic fortunes in spain also reversed. Ironically those same Granadino forces you mentioned fought in a very western way- when compared to Turks or Saracens farther east. In the 13th century and before there would be little distinguishing Spanish nobles and Granadino nobles as they would both be chain mailed, lance armed heavy cavaly. In the case of spain in that age it was a case of their enemies having all their advantages as well as a more varied and usually better led force overall.

Good stuff and all true. One of the many reasons the Almoarvids and Almohads detested the Al-Andalusians was their similar 'dress sense' in terms of heavy armour, weapons and horses, to the 'european' north.

Those .....ists were surely a God-send in every sense of the word to the Almohads that is for sure.

The Spanish historian Quesada refers heavily to the massive detail in the painting of the Battle of la Higuerela hanging in El Escorial for both Granadino and Castillian troops. Though this was around 1432 the only things that would alter the appearance significantly over the two and a half centuries of the Nazari kingdom was the later introduction of gunpowder.
 
Joined May 2014
247 Posts | 0+
U.S.A.
Good stuff and all true. One of the many reasons the Almoarvids and Almohads detested the Al-Andalusians was their similar 'dress sense' in terms of heavy armour, weapons and horses, to the 'european' north.
.

The Al-Andalusians were very dangerous opponents. Ironically many christian knights and knaves served them as well at times. If you read about the fall of Granada the behaviors of both sides sound like it could be the English and Scottish border wars or something similiar if you change a few names with all the knightly duels and Western European chivalry :)
 
Joined May 2014
247 Posts | 0+
U.S.A.
Historically the religious knight orders have been a kind of parenthesis. Even if theoretically some of them still could fight [Malta Knights and Teutonic Knights are still organized in knight orders embedded in Catholic Church, btw ... the "original", this point is to be clarified, Teutonic Order is still there, it's part of Catholic clergy with more than 1,000 members, counting about 100 priests and 200 nuns], today they deal with charity and similar activities.

The Teutonic Order had something particular, which give "nutrition" to the myth: they run crusaders against Pagans in North East Europe, they created real states and they attracted European aristocracy and knights with their "Reisen" ... real little crusades by invitation [they invited knights from all over the Europe to join them for these seasonal wars against the Pagans and some of the guests deserved the honor to seat at the high table with the GrandMaster].

So, sure it was something particular.

Which really adds to the Teutonic knights accomplishment in a way. They created a real state as you say in that they were a solid body and player in european politics, but in some way they were somewhat what i would call an "Artificial" state, with no real claim to the land they are in in the feudal sense (at least at first) and relying on religious propaganda for support and recruitment, They accomplished a hell of a lot. People just tend to forget that somewhere between 1 out of 7-10 of their men were knightly killing machines, the rest were usually some sad levy troop of some kind.
 
Joined Nov 2010
14,406 Posts | 4,143+
Cornwall
Last edited:
The Al-Andalusians were very dangerous opponents. Ironically many christian knights and knaves served them as well at times. If you read about the fall of Granada the behaviors of both sides sound like it could be the English and Scottish border wars or something similiar if you change a few names with all the knightly duels and Western European chivalry :)

Right up until the War of Granada there would be single combat challenges of the type made by El Cid in his youth - before the walls in the manner of Achilles and Hector in the original Troy story. King Ferdinand banned them as an anachronism and a waste of good men, but the ban didn't always work. By the end of the War of Granada the modern age had dawned and the chivalrous one-on-one combat was truly dead.

But that is about Granadinos. The 'Al Andalusians' weren't that 'dangerous' before that for the following reasons:

The Caliphate under Abderraman III, then Alhaken then Almanzor became increasingly reliant on a standing army of mercenaries who were mainly slavic or berber (African immigrants, not first-wave Spain berbers). This was a very large force for the time and was divided into mixed units to remove any chance of rebellious power blocs forming. The reliance on individual nobles/cities to provide troops for the Caliphal army was almost entirely removed and, with an omnipotent and dictatorial force in control of the Peninsula there was little need (or encouragement) for individual lords to retain private forces in the style of the feudal north.

The collapse of the Calphate removed all that and suddenly - relatively - Al Andalus was divided into 30+ Taifas (individual kingdoms) - see my thread on these Taifas some time ago for lists etc. These Taifas were economically strong but, for the reasons described above, militarily weak. The northern christian states - heavily feudal and therefore inherently constructed for war - suddenly found themselves in control after a century of being effectively ruled by the Caliphate - which pulled all the strings.

Example - the Kingdom of Zaragoza, one of the largest Taifas - could only muster '300 lances' at the time El Cid was employed by them in the late 11th century - so we had Cid with 2 or 3000 'lances' riding with only a relative few from his employers.

The Taifa kingdoms were now easy prey and all became dependent on christian states, paying more and more of their income in pariahs. A historically confusing time when alliances were formed between any state, muslim or christian, with the most fierce enemies often being their own co-religionist next door. This obviously eventually led to the successive waves of invader from Africa - the Almoravids, house guests who eventually killed the hosts and took over and the Almohads - even more fanatical invaders pure and simple. Both these Empires had little respect for the militarily weak, loose-moralled (to fanatics), wine-drinking, womanising Al Andalusian Taifa kings who dressed in the style of christian heavy armour, jewels and extravagence.

Fast forward to the fall of Seville to Fernando III El Santo - aided by troops from Granada of course - and we were left with the Nazari Kingdom of Granada, founded by Al Nasr. Granada had powerful natural defences, powerful castle defences - many courtesy of the Almohads - and developed a more militaristic culture than the Taifas as well as a strong economy. Even so it could never compete with the heavy militarisation and 'crusading' now in the north and was always a tributary of Castille. Wars would break out every now and again when someone refused to pay the levies to Castille in a method of gaining popular support.

Granada was strong and united for the first generation of it's existence, but after around the turn of the 1300s was forever consumed in an eternally self-weakening round of politics, political assassinations and civil wars, as 3 factions constantly vied for power without any leader emerging to bring full unity. This would haunt it through the last nearly-200 years of it's existence and even play a decisive factor in the fall of Granada during the War of 1482-92.

But the strong mountains and fortresses were still there, the strong castles and as Castille chipped away at it's edges, the population increased with soldiers and population imported from surrendered towns.

Despite everything against Granada, it took the mighty war machine of King Ferdinand 10 years to take the Kingdom in the War of Granada - a fascinating war well worth reading about and one for which I have visited many of the battle and siege sites.

Several adverse factors made the fall of Granada inevitable, without which it may well have been there much longer:

1) Ferdinand's innovational reliance on heavy artillery and expert gunners from Italy and elsewhere - rendering previous inpregnable fortresses vulnerable. Only useable in the summer campaign season.
2) Boabdil's constant undermining, treachery and civil wars
3) Lack of material and miltary support/allies in North Africa and Constantinople
4) Garrison troops defending their home town were ultimately faced with an ultimatum under Ferdinand's modus operandii - resist strongly and face the fact all your goods will be seized and your wife and children sold into slavery, or surrender and keep your goods, families and religion etc - it was only later that he reneged on all his promises of course. means to an end. It is much easier to fight to the death defending a far-off fortress than defending your own house.
 
Joined May 2014
247 Posts | 0+
U.S.A.
Right up until the War of Granada there would be single combat challenges of the type made by El Cid in his youth - before the walls in the manner of Achilles and Hector in the original Troy story. King Ferdinand banned them as an anachronism and a waste of good men, but the ban didn't always work. By the end of the War of Granada the modern age had dawned and the chivalrous one-on-one combat was truly dead.

But that is about Granadinos. The 'Al Andalusians' weren't that 'dangerous' before that for the following reasons:

The Caliphate under Abderraman III, then Alhaken then Almanzor became increasingly reliant on a standing army of mercenaries who were mainly slavic or berber (African immigrants, not first-wave Spain berbers). This was a very large force for the time and was divided into mixed units to remove any chance of rebellious power blocs forming. The reliance on individual nobles/cities to provide troops for the Caliphal army was almost entirely removed and, with an omnipotent and dictatorial force in control of the Peninsula there was little need (or encouragement) for individual lords to retain private forces in the style of the feudal north.

The collapse of the Calphate removed all that and suddenly - relatively - Al Andalus was divided into 30+ Taifas (individual kingdoms) - see my thread on these Taifas some time ago for lists etc. These Taifas were economically strong but, for the reasons described above, militarily weak. The northern christian states - heavily feudal and therefore inherently constructed for war - suddenly found themselves in control after a century of being effectively ruled by the Caliphate - which pulled all the strings.

Example - the Kingdom of Zaragoza, one of the largest Taifas - could only muster '300 lances' at the time El Cid was employed by them in the late 11th century - so we had Cid with 2 or 3000 'lances' riding with only a relative few from his employers.

The Taifa kingdoms were now easy prey and all became dependent on christian states, paying more and more of their income in pariahs. A historically confusing time when alliances were formed between any state, muslim or christian, with the most fierce enemies often being their own co-religionist next door. This obviously eventually led to the successive waves of invader from Africa - the Almoravids, house guests who eventually killed the hosts and took over and the Almohads - even more fanatical invaders pure and simple. Both these Empires had little respect for the militarily weak, loose-moralled (to fanatics), wine-drinking, womanising Al Andalusian Taifa kings who dressed in the style of christian heavy armour, jewels and extravagence.

Fast forward to the fall of Seville to Fernando III El Santo - aided by troops from Granada of course - and we were left with the Nazari Kingdom of Granada, founded by Al Nasr. Granada had powerful natural defences, powerful castle defences - many courtesy of the Almohads - and developed a more militaristic culture than the Taifas as well as a strong economy. Even so it could never compete with the heavy militarisation and 'crusading' now in the north and was always a tributary of Castille. Wars would break out every now and again when someone refused to pay the levies to Castille in a method of gaining popular support.

Granada was strong and united for the first generation of it's existence, but after around the turn of the 1300s was forever consumed in an eternally self-weakening round of politics, political assassinations and civil wars, as 3 factions constantly vied for power without any leader emerging to bring full unity. This would haunt it through the last nearly-200 years of it's existence and even play a decisive factor in the fall of Granada during the War of 1482-92.

But the strong mountains and fortresses were still there, the strong castles and as Castille chipped away at it's edges, the population increased with soldiers and population imported from surrendered towns.

Despite everything against Granada, it took the mighty war machine of King Ferdinand 10 years to take the Kingdom in the War of Granada - a fascinating war well worth reading about and one for which I have visited many of the battle and siege sites.

Several adverse factors made the fall of Granada inevitable, without which it may well have been there much longer:

1) Ferdinand's innovational reliance on heavy artillery and expert gunners from Italy and elsewhere - rendering previous inpregnable fortresses vulnerable. Only useable in the summer campaign season.
2) Boabdil's constant undermining, treachery and civil wars
3) Lack of material and miltary support/allies in North Africa and Constantinople
4) Garrison troops defending their home town were ultimately faced with an ultimatum under Ferdinand's modus operandii - resist strongly and face the fact all your goods will be seized and your wife and children sold into slavery, or surrender and keep your goods, families and religion etc - it was only later that he reneged on all his promises of course. means to an end. It is much easier to fight to the death defending a far-off fortress than defending your own house.

The part about the Hector and Achilles style duels was a great analogy. I still think they were formidable in their own sense being wedged between hostile forces without being absorbed completely by one or the other. But to be fair look how hard of a time Rome had taking Spain. No force could just blow through it with all its defensible positions and ambush spots. In many ways the Al-Andalusians were the true inhabitants of spain torn between Berber and Frankish colonizers. I bet those locations you visited were one hell of a sight. I would love to see that
 
Joined Nov 2010
14,406 Posts | 4,143+
Cornwall
The part about the Hector and Achilles style duels was a great analogy. I still think they were formidable in their own sense being wedged between hostile forces without being absorbed completely by one or the other. But to be fair look how hard of a time Rome had taking Spain. No force could just blow through it with all its defensible positions and ambush spots. In many ways the Al-Andalusians were the true inhabitants of spain torn between Berber and Frankish colonizers. I bet those locations you visited were one hell of a sight. I would love to see that

Good thing about Spain is a lot of the castles and villages are still there even in the north, bar a load blown up by Marshall Suchet in the Peninsula war. Many of the little villages are as they were at the time of the War of Granada and I'm hoping to take in a few more on hols next week. In England 'Edwardian' is an old house.

The way I look at the Caliphal/Amiri period is this. Cordoba was all powerful and the little christian states were all at the beck and call of the ruthless Caliph Abderraman III, who decided kings and made marriages throughout the Peninsula. Like when (later) Almanzor dismantled the bells at Santiago and made the enslaved monks carry them back to Cordoba, or when he dismantled Barcelona entirely and enslaved the population, they could walk into the north at any time (Simancas was a strange blip).

They could have conquered at that time in my opinion. But with the christian states normally allies with the Cordoba of Abderraman III and Alhaken - out of prudence - with the odd periodical brief exception, what justification would there be for disturbing the political balance? And with expansion/raiding over the Pyrenees a more challenging proposal with a new set of consequences, the christian states were used as a convenient source of revenue during the later raids of Almanzor. Revenue which funded the self-perpetuating military state.

Of course as is often the case it all fell apart rapidly from within after the death of Abd Al Malik, Almanzor's eldest son.
 
Joined May 2014
247 Posts | 0+
U.S.A.
They could have conquered at that time in my opinion. But with the christian states normally allies with the Cordoba of Abderraman III and Alhaken - out of prudence - with the odd periodical brief exception said:
Not to mention a buffer zone between them and France and accelerated motivation for a western crusade
 
Joined Nov 2010
14,406 Posts | 4,143+
Cornwall
Not to mention a buffer zone between them and France and accelerated motivation for a western crusade

Yes I know what you are saying and in effect that was largely created earlier (in the east) by Charlemage to define the common border with the earlier Emirate of Cordoba.

But crusading was a notion for the future, unheard of for another hundred years. The world in 'Spain' was totally different in the 10th and 11th centuries and it is very, very difficult to visualise from our point in time with the now-well-known concepts of ´Crusade`and ´Reconquista`.
 

Trending History Discussions

Top