The Political Structure of Ur, 2112-2004 BCE: A Brief Analysis using Royal Documents

Joined Oct 2012
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Spanning about a century from 2112 to 2004 BCE, the period of the Third Dynasty of Ur, or Ur III, is among the most fascinating as well as best-documented epochs of ancient history. With tens of thousands of texts available to historians, Ur III is one of the earliest states in human history for which a detailed analysis and reconstruction is possible. For reconstructing the administrative bureaucracy and political structure of the Ur III state, among the most important primary sources are the letters sent between the king of Ur and his subordinates. This royal correspondence gives the modern reader a rare inside look of ancient Mesopotamian politics, and allows one to evaluate the Ur III political system.

When examining the royal epistolary literature of the Ur III period, one is struck by the prominence of the king, and the central role that he occupies. The king of Ur is not a mere ritual figure, but a powerful monarch who possesses the ability to mobilize significant quantities of resources, including civilian and military manpower. For example, the general Puzur-Shulgi, who was in charge of the border fort of Bad-igihursaga, sent a letter requesting 7,200 workers and 600 soldiers from King Shulgi, his master. Similarly, King Shu-Sin authorized the governor of Zimudar to send troops to the fortification of Muriq-Tidnim. The fact that subordinates had to go through the king in order to obtain more troops suggests that the king was the main broker of military forces in the region. People like Puzur-Shulgi had military power only insofar as they were granted military resources by the decision of the king; in other words, these figures were dependent agents of the central government, embodied by the monarchy of Ur.

The central role of the king is also apparent in the manner in which letters are addressed, and loyalty to the king expressed. Officials like the “prime minister” Aradmu, for example, refer to the king as their “liege”, and themselves as his “servants.” The rhetoric of obeisance is quite strong in these letters, with subordinates repeatedly emphasizing their loyalty and obedience to the king, and ensuring the king that they are performing their duties as ordered. The impression one gets from the royal correspondence is that loyalty to the king himself, and not loyalty to the state, was the primary “glue” that held the Ur III administrative apparatus together. In other words, the Ur III state seems to have had characteristics of a patrimonial state, where authority flows directly from the leader to his subordinates. The main agents through which royal power was expressed in this patrimonial system were the shagina, a class of military administrators who were often outsiders in the areas to which they were deputed, and whose power depended on the resources provided to them by the central government. As such, these military administrators were personally dependent on the king. The patrimonial ties of loyalty between the king and the shagina were further reinforced by intermarriage of these governor-generals into the king’s family, as well as the religious ideology propounded by the Ur III state, which treated its kings as living gods on earth. This religious ideology, in fact, extended much beyond the political administration; even common citizens are known to have borne names like “Shulgi is my god,” which shows the centrality of the monarch in the general society of Ur, as well as in its political structure.

One of the most important powers possessed by the king of Ur was the ability of the monarch to relieve a particular subordinate of his administrative and/or military duty, and assign him to a different task while appointing a new subordinate to carry out the task previously entrusted to the relieved official. We see this in a letter by King Shu-Sin to Sharrum-bani, who was active at the fortifications of Muriq-Tidnim. Sharrum-bani incurred the displeasure of King Shu-Sin when he fought against the Amorites in the north, apparently ignoring the orders of the king to focus on building fortifications. As such, Sharrum-bani was assigned the new task of digging a moat, while the royal minister Babati was appointed by Shu-Sin to carry out the building of fortifications previously entrusted to Sharrum-bani.

Based on the discussion thus far, we can see that the Ur III state was quite centralized and personalized. The king had far-reaching powers, including the authority to dispatch troops and workers between different regions of the empire, and to replace subordinates as he saw fit. The king stood at the apex of society, and subjects of Ur were bound to the king by religious ideology. However, we should be careful not to exaggerate or overstate the degree of centralization in the Ur III period. The patrimonial military administration of the shagina existed alongside a civil administration of governors (ensi), who represented the more decentralized political culture of the pre-Ur III period. These governors still had the ability to mobilize some resources of their own, as seen when Lu-Nanna, the governor of Zimudar, dispatched 7,200 workers to Sharrum-bani; there is no indication in the letter that the king of Ur was responsible for providing these workers, or authorizing their mobilization. Indeed, the very fact that regions reverted so easily to their local habits in the post-Ur III period, suggests that the central government of Ur was never able to completely erase the local character of Mesopotamian civilization. In addition, we have evidence that, at least in some instances, the king of Ur himself favored a decentralization of powers. This is seen most clearly in the letter of King Shulgi to Aradmu, where King Shulgi dismisses Aradmu’s accusations of the high commissioner Apillasha. Shulgi states that Apillasha’s actions were justified, for his elevation of authority allows him to maintain order in the border regions more effectively; thus, in the borderlands, it seems that the central government tolerated a greater degree of independence of its officials, while the core heartland was administered in a more centralized and more direct fashion.

The question of centralization is also related to the question of specialization among subordinates. Figures like Puzur-Shulgi, Sharrum-bani, as well as Aradmu seem to have relatively specialized duties. The duties of the former two seem to have mainly consisted of military defense, while Aradmu had somewhat broader duties that included tax organization, intelligence gathering, and establishing contact with other subordinates. In comparison, the high commissioner Apillasha seems to have had much broader duties, for King Shulgi seems to have expected him to function almost as a “miniature king” in the borderlands. Thus, we see that the subordinates most under the thumb of the central government (e.g. Sharrum-bani) had the most specialized duties, while those under the least central control (Apillasha) had the least specialized duties and the greatest freedom of action.

As a relatively centralized polity, the Ur III state had some major advantages over its predecessors as well as immediate successors. The state had the ability to mobilize significant amounts of resources (which it systematically gathered from its provinces), and was less likely to suffer frequent revolts from nominally subjugated regions, as the Akkadian empire had to face. However, there were both strengths and weaknesses to the Ur III system. The patrimonial nature of Ur III administration, and the crucial political role played by the king, meant that any personal weaknesses or defects in the individual king could have grave consequences for the state as a whole. A personally weak or indecisive king, for example, might lessen the confidence of the subordinates in the administration, and erode the superhuman aura of a “divine king” built up by religious ideology. Moreover, the very efficiency of a centralized state in extracting and then redistributing resources might have led to increased discontent among provincial governors. Either or both of these issues might have contributed to the collapse of the bala system under Ibbi-Sin, the meteoric rise of Ishbi-Erra, and the ultimate fall of the Third Dynasty of Ur.
 
Joined Oct 2012
3,562 Posts | 807+
Z
In case someone is curious, the reference I used for English translations of the Sumerian royal documents is Mark Chavalas (ed.), The Ancient Near East: Historical Sources in Translation (2006).
 
Joined Oct 2013
315 Posts | 2+
Australia
I found this very interesting. I am looking for a good book on Akkad/Sargon and also the periods just before and after Sargon's Akkadian empire. Know any good ones?
 
Joined Oct 2012
3,562 Posts | 807+
Z
I found this very interesting. I am looking for a good book on Akkad/Sargon and also the periods just before and after Sargon's Akkadian empire. Know any good ones?

This is my preferred secondary source for all things related to ancient Near Eastern history:

[ame="http://www.amazon.com/History-Ancient-Near-East-3000/dp/1405149116"]Amazon.com: A History of the Ancient Near East ca. 3000 - 323 BC, 2nd Edition (9781405149112): Marc Van de Mieroop, Marc van der Mieroop: Books@@AMEPARAM@@http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51hIZBlxAmL.@@AMEPARAM@@51hIZBlxAmL[/ame]


The book also has a great bibliography and recommendations for further reading, in case you want to explore a particular topic more in depth.
 

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