[Originally Posted by
beorna
No, sorry. In his memoirs Harris said, that the germans didn't use the chance of aerea bombing in 1940/41 to destroy BRITISH (and of course not german) towns.
The US american Henry Arnold wrote in an report about german destruction in London, that mainly legal targets were hit. About the collateral damage I wrote above.
Against a german terror bombing in those days speaks as well clearly the ammunition. It was in great parts explosive and not incendiary bombs.
Rotterdam and Warsaw, which can morally be called crimes, were as well legal targets according to the HC.
To put the start of moral bombing into the shoes of Hitler is wrong. But of course I can understand, that for the british public the collateral damage was impressive and that they acted under this impression.]
You seriously misrepresent Harris. Have you actually read his book?
In fact Harris explicitly states that German
did use area bombing in 1940/41.
"The enemy [Germany] remained, in fact ... in the stage of supposing that the primary object of bombing, when aimed exclusively toward small military objectives, was to break morale. But this did mean that the Germans, as soon as they were defeated in their aim of hitting military objectives by daylight, passed at once to area bombing. And in this they had such successes as must inevitably come, with however little forethought, when a large force attacks an almost undefended country."
"Bomber Offensive" Sir Arthur Harris, Collins 1947 at p.86
Harris argues that the Luftwaffe was not able to use area bombing to destroy the British because the available bomber force was inadequate, not because it was witheld from the role.In the same chapter, he also recounts how British analyse of the damage done to British cities and British industries indicated that damage to the city's infrastructure had a longer term impact on production than direct damage to factories themselves. This was the cornerstone of the British area campaign.
It is generally accepted that German attacks were primarily aimed at industry, but with civilian casualties recognised as occuring. Nonetheless, British city centres were attacked even when their industry lay on the outskirts.
Birmingham, for instance, with its industry located around the periphery, saw its city centre hit on 25th August 1940. Coventry demonstrated how an attack aimed at the centre of a small city could disrupt its industry (as the British repeated at Rostock in 1942). The centre of London was attacked separately from the docks and industrial targets - notably on 29 Dec 40, when the City of London was devastated and where the main aiming point (the attack was curtailed and only the City was heavily attacked) appears to have been the West End - commercial, not industrial.
In October 1940, Luftwaffe crews ceased to be briefed on a specific target and were given instead a target area containing industry, docks etc. hence "area bombing" and the same approach the British would later use.
I note you seem convinced that the Luftwaffe used a minimum of incendaries and very large bombs, compared with the RAF. It is a recognised fact of the Blitz that German use of incendaries increased dramatically as the attacks went on and Luftwaffe tactics were refined (if that is the right word).
For instance; Coventry received 503 tons of HE and 881 incendiary canisters on the night of 14 Nov 40. When the Luftwaffe went back in the Spring of 1941 (8 Apr), with a raid of about half the size (237 aircraft to 449), the amount of HE dropped to 315 tons, but incendiary canisters numbered 710.
The change was even more marked at Southampton, where its first large raid (17 Nov) saw 198 tons of HE and 300 incendiary canisters. At the end of the month (30 Nov-1Dec) the consecutive raids delivered 299 tons of HE but 1184 incendiary canisters. Plymouth saw its first large raid (27 Nov) deliver 110 tons of HE and a mere 170 incendiary cannisters. But the 21-23 April raids, by a bomber force more than three times the size, saw 403 tons of HE delivered, compared to 2568 incendiary cannisters, a fifteen-fold increase.
The Luftwaffe also introduced increasingly large bombs, beginning with arial mines diverted from their primary purpose, and then the Herman and the Satan (4000lbs). These developing weapon mixes had tremendous material effect - Clydebank and Hull, for instance, both lost over 90% of their housing stock.
These developments ended when the Luftwaffe withdrew to support the invasion of Russia, not through any moral nicety on the part of Luftwaffe planners.
The only thing that differentiated the Luftwaffe's attacks during the Blitz of 40/41 and the subsequent RAF attacks on Germany was the scale of the attack. The target sets, aiming techniques and weapon mixes were all employed by the Luftwaffe before the RAF (if only because the RAF was not in a position to take on more distant targets in Germany in force until the end of 1940).
Again, I am not arguing that the British raids were reprisals (although the Luftwaffe often claimed that
German raids were, even during the Blitz). There was surprisingly little call for reprisals among the British public, most of it from people in areas that had not been bombed. The point I am making is that the targetting rationales and attack methods had already been employed in the Autumn and Winter of 1940/41 and were not exceptional.