Bombing of German cities during World War II

Garry_Owen · Feb 13, 2012

Grimald said:
I am relatively new to this forum and did not anticipate how this thread would develop. Of course, I knew that I was touching a sensitive issue, but I expected a less emotional and more polite discussion.

Me too! I have started one or two threads that have literally blown up in my face so I just retired from them and let the combatants let rip at one another. You won't get a logical, reasoned discussion here. It's mostly emotion. It reminds me of arguments I've had with my teenage children!

I have every sympathy (sitting in my armchair) with people who have been traumatized and terrorized by the barbarity of war wanting to retaliate personally on their enemies in like measure. But, while that might provide a mitigating factor for the perpetrator of similar retaliatory outrage it does not, and never will, provide justification for it. We can all readily identify with an outraged and enraged victim.

What is even more true is that the people responsible for authorising, planning and executing 'in cold blood' the area bombing of civilians (and not just those civilians who were collateral damage to military targets) have just gone down to the level of their enemies and are therefore no better.

How did the bomber crews feel about their work? I am referring exclusively to those bombing operations where no conventional military targets were the objective and the planners were intent on bombing civilians. Do we have cases of crewmen expressing concern or even refusing to do it?

diddyriddick · Feb 13, 2012

Kevinmeath said:
The Americans bombed German cities as much as the RAF, they attempted and failed to 'pin point' military targets and in the end were no more accurate than the British .

They however continued to claim that they pinpointed 'military targets' with 'precision bombing'.

While I will grant that the Norden bombsight wasn't all that it was cracked up to be, I'm not sold. The RAF was bombing cities without even giving lip-service to military targets-their bombs frequently ended up miles away from their intended target. By comparison, the US Army Air Corps was bombing discreet targets that were visually identified. Perhaps you have a reliable source to support your assertion.

diddyriddick · Feb 13, 2012

Guaporense said:
It was neither. Japan knew they had no chance of winning when Germany was defeated.

Perhaps you have sources to support that assertion.

Kevinmeath · Feb 13, 2012

diddyriddick said:
While I will grant that the Norden bombsight wasn't all that it was cracked up to be, I'm not sold. The RAF was bombing cities without even giving lip-service to military targets-their bombs frequently ended up miles away from their intended target. By comparison, the US Army Air Corps was bombing discreet targets that were visually identified. Perhaps you have a reliable source to support your assertion.

“There is nothing to show that the B-17’s and B-24’s were significantly more accurate in their bombing than the British Lancasters and Halifaxs. Indeed, the reality of sending large formations of bombers over Germany made the sort of precision the Americans claimed practically impossible. Often only the lead plane was equipped with the super accurate Norden bombsight, and the ones behind simply dropped their bombs at the same time as the leader, even if they were flying miles behind it at the time. Inevitably, they would fall over a wide area. As a result there was very little difference between what each air force actually did to Germany, how much damage they inflicted, how many lives they took. The Americans aimed at precise targets- and devastated whole cities in the process. The RAF devastated whole cities to be sure of destroying strategic targets The main difference was largely semantic but the American position had one main advantage – by claiming precision bombing and dissociating themselves from the taint of area bombing, the Eighth Air Force stayed out of the bitter moral argument that would eventually engulf the RAF and Bomber Command”

Taken from ‘TAIL-END CHARLIES The Last Battles of the Bomber War’ pg 95-96 by John Nichol and Tony Rennell

Bloodandsteel · Feb 13, 2012

Lucius said:
Bloodandsteel,

I deleted your post -

As you know, it is plagiarized from -

http://battleofbritain1940.net/bobhs...b-account.html

and -

http://www.airforce-magazine.com/Mag...808battle.aspx

Please read our policy about plagiarism -

http://www.historum.com/forum-feedback-announcements/14892-plagiarism.html

You are being given this warning on the assumption that you don't know any better than to not plagiarize. Rest assured, there will be no further warnings.

Very sincerely yours,

Lucius

The public domain can't be plagerized, but I know better than to argue. Is it permissable to leave a link instead?

• PLAGIARISM (noun)
The noun PLAGIARISM has 2 senses:
1. a piece of writing that has been copied from someone else and is presented as being your own work
2. the act of plagiarizing; taking someone's words or ideas as if they were your own

Am I being accused of passing this work off as my mine?

Kevinmeath · Feb 13, 2012

diddyriddick said:
................................. Perhaps you have a reliable source to support your assertion.

“ The Americans had entered the war convinced that
they would bomb specific industrial targets visually, from high altitude bombers flying in self-defending groups. But like the British, the Americans found themselves making significant wartime modifications to their prewar bombing doctrine. Cloudy north European weather often negated the aid of the much-hyped Norden bombsight, preventing the Americans from being able to deliver the kind of precision strikes they had counted on making. A conference on bombing accuracy held in March 1945 would reveal that when the Eighth Air Force bombed through the omnipresent heavy cloud cover in the winter of 1944-45, 42 per cent of bombs fell
more than five miles from their target.

In order to maintain a reasonable operating tempo the Americans had taken to frequent attacks on railway marshaling yards—large, visible targets either inside of, or on the outskirts of major cities. Though such raids were designated and recorded as attacks on “communications” or “transportation” targets, they were often—in their effects—hard to distinguish from area raids. The Americans included incendiary
bombs in the ordnance mix for bombers flying these raids since they could cause widespread collateral damage and raise the likelihood of broad destruction and disruption for targets shrouded in cloud. The target category “marshaling yards” received more of the Eighth’s bomb tonnage than any other; indeed, more than a quarter of all the Eighth Air Force bombs dropped over Europe fell on marshaling yards. As historian Richard Davis has pointed out, “Large numbers of planes scattering their
bombs around their mostly unseen and unverifiable aiming points surely would cause great collateral damage to any soft structures located nearby.”

Even though the Americans strongly preferred to strike specific industrial
sites (and flew to those whenever weather permitted), the bulk of their raids through cloud were, in essence, area raids. In order to distinguish their efforts from those of the British, however, the Americans continued to use language that depicted them as “precision” bombing of specific military targets. The insistence on this particular language reflected ongoing American sensitivities about the ethical questions raised by strategic bombing. But the limited impact of aerial bombing
had caused the Americans no end of frustration during the war. In January 1945 Gen. Arnold had openly expressed his dismay over the failure of bombing to halt Germany in its tracks. He told Gen. Spaatz that despite a five-to-one superiority in the air, and “in spite of all our hopes, anticipations, dreams and plans, we have as yet not been able to capitalize to the extent which we should.”
Taken from.
‘Dresden 1945: Reality, History, and Memory’ by Tami Davis Biddle The Journal of Military History, Volume 72, Number 2, April 2008,
pp. 413-450

Spartacuss · Feb 13, 2012

November 8, 1944... Lt. Gen. Pete Quesada, commander of the IX TAF, discussed a plan he was formulating for a massive air campaign into Germany that he called the Jeb Stuart Plan with his Chief of Communications, Col. Blair Garland. Quesada proposed that in an effort to collapse the weakening German transportation system and impress the German people with allied air power, every available allied plane would attack a thousand objectives in a hundred cities yet untouched by any bombings. Garland was returning briefly to the US the next day with Hap Arnold's civilian tech expert, David Griggs, who Quesada also discussed his plan with.

Garland and Griggs got Arnold's attention on the matter and Marshall and Roosevelt thought it might be a good idea given the slowing of the allied advance that fall. Marshall sent the plan to SHAEF for consideration, telling Eisenhower, "this plan looks like something we should look into." In the process of this consideration in theater, SHAEF's Phychological Warfare Division denounced the plan as terroristic, and it was killed. No effort by higher command was taken to override the decision.

My source: "Over Lord General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II", Chapter 9, pg. 265, Thomas Alexander Hughes, The Free Press (Simon & Schuster, Inc.) New York, New York.

Bloodandsteel · Feb 13, 2012

redcoat said:
No. Hitler had only forbidden attacks on London, any other British city could be bombed and many were.

Hiya Red. You could be right about that.

There seems to have been a lot of them getting lost then. A number of attacks on the suburbs of London were recorded before the RAF responded with any attack on Berlin

Suburbs, and they could have whacked London proper?

Sorry, but that is one of the greatest myths of WW2. On the 7 September 1940 the RAF had over 100 more operational Spitfires and Hurricanes and 150 more operational pilots than they did at the start of the battle.
The Luftwaffe was losing the battle even before the change of target.

The Luftwaffe was losing more aircraft than the Brits. The RAF had no bombers in the air. The RAF was running out of pilots and aircraft. They could NOT maintain the offensive but for another couple of weeks. The RAF airports, logistics, and support were being hammered daily at times. I would leave you a para from your own websites but it appears in doing so I have been accused of plagiarism.

Blood.

Bloodandsteel · Feb 13, 2012

Brisieis said:
Beorna, you say I don't know anything about aerial warfare simply because I do not condone the bombing of British cities by the Germans in WWII? I find it insulting that you and Grimald want to play judge and jury to the British for bombing Germany, when the Germans bombed Britain in kind. One rule for Germany and another rule for Britain is it? The bombing of Coventry is justified because it had parts that were industrial? well, that is a justification to reduce an entire city to crumbling rubble isn't it? What makes a Dresden citizen life more important than a Coventry or London citizen life?

This is not addressed to me but I would like to comment if you don't mind.
You said yourself in an earlier post that Dresden should not have been bombed.

I actually dread in more years to come, when this kind of debate will go further into the gloomy support of Adolf Hitler. No doubt in a hundred years or so, people will 'get' why Hitler did what he did, who knows he may even become a hero again.... after all... the big bad British are to blame for WWII with their rash bombings of Germany... how dreadful those British people are! No wonder there were people like Hitler, maybe he ain't such a bad guy after all?

Do you have a degree in extrapolation by chance? jj. No one is saying anything of the sort. Hitler by any definition was a monster and a curse on mankind. He is responsible for the deaths of over 50 Million people. I don't know of anyone that claimed the British were to blame for WW2. You make some really good points but when you get off with understandable emotion, it dilutes your otherwise excellent post.

Blood.

Bloodandsteel · Feb 13, 2012

redcoat said:
According to the USAAF guidelines any town or city with a railway running through it was a legitimate target.

ps: The RAF only bombed Dresden once, the USAAF bombed it six times. The last being a raid by 580 bombers on the 17 April 1945

Because Churchill was already catching heat for it. Awe what the heck. Lets blame the Americans. Now how about the fact that the RAF Bomber Command bombed mostly German women and kids for the British air contribution to WW2.

Don't beat me up please cos I'm kinda sensitive yanno.

diddyriddick · Feb 13, 2012

Bloodandsteel said:
The public domain can't be plagerized, but I know better than to argue. Is it permissable to leave a link instead?

• PLAGIARISM (noun)
The noun PLAGIARISM has 2 senses:
1. a piece of writing that has been copied from someone else and is presented as being your own work
2. the act of plagiarizing; taking someone's words or ideas as if they were your own

Am I being accused of passing this work off as my mine?

The bottom line is that you quoted another author and did NOT give that author credit. We're not going to split legal hairs with you. Since you didn't read our policy on plagiarism, I will quote it for you:

"In case somebody didn't know, plagiarism is the use of someone else's text without citing the source. When one does that, he is allowing the reader to assume that the work is his own."

And this is how I would cite it:

http://www.historum.com/forum-feedback-announcements/14892-plagiarism.html

That way there is no chance that I misrepresent someone else's work as mine.

If you use another author's words on historum, then you MUST cite that author. Period. If you have any further questions, please feel free to PM any moderator.

Solidaire · Feb 13, 2012

Grimald said:
Most major cities in Germany today are remarkably ugly, consisting of cheap, shabby post-war architecture and modernist concrete blocks. Most people don’t even notice that, because they are so used to it. After all, they think, Germany is a place for work and business, and not for pleasure and aesthetics. A small minority of people, however, is actually interested in the historic development of German cities and has started to ask uncomfortable questions. For me personally, born several decades after the war, seeing photographs and video footage of German cities before World War II came as a revelation. I felt betrayed, deceived, and filled with a feeling of loss.

The destruction of German cities, and with it, the killing of approximately 500,000 people, was mainly brought about by strategic bombing, that is, aerial bombing of cities not located in combat zones. Some cities were further damaged by tactical warfare, e.g. artillery, in the final months of the war. The rebuilding of the cities after the war did not heal the wounds: Often, buildings which were only partially damaged or even undamaged, were torn down in favor of modernist city planning. All in all, I would like to state the hypothesis that the destruction of German cities represents the greatest cultural loss in recorded history.

Of course, strategic bombing did not happen out of nowhere; there was clearly a context to it which is necessary to understand its roots. Germany under Nazi rule was an aggressive, expansionist state which somehow had to be stopped. And the German Luftwaffe set disturbing examples of how to destroy a city, e.g. Warsaw, Rotterdam, and Belgrade, and most importantly, English cities.

What do you think of the bombing of German cities? Did it achieve its declared aim, that is, destroying the morale of the ennemy? Did it contribute to shortening the war? Was it legitimate, as a normal means of fighting - or as a retaliation of crimes committed by Germany? Should the campaign have been stopped or modified in the last months of the war?

Grimald, I understand your sense of loss, and sincerely share it. War is a shameful habit of the human race, total war is totally shameful and immoral. I hate to be drawn into this horrible dilemma, how one responds to as an aggressive regime as Nazism was, how to respond to its total war, and where one draws a limit to the actions needed to vanquish it. For what's worth, here are few of my thoughts.

It is my constant belief that one must not equate himself with what he's actually fighting against. Even if craving for revenge is an understandable emotion in times of war, it is morally wrong. Fighting against Nazism was justified, and if there was even a "just" war, that was it. Punishing the German population in general, wasn't.

Practically, I'm sure that certain bombings were justified, in strategic terms. However, the extent of destruction, demolition of German cities, and killing of civilians, wasn't. Even if this extent yielded some positive results (undermining the morale of the enemy, further destroying resources and infrastructure), these results were asymmetric to their cost in human lives, and ultimately to the very goal of WWII: to destroy an inhuman regime and restore peace and humanism across Europe.

Aesthetics and lost beauty was, of course, the least of concerns in those horrible times of WWII. It is a lamentable loss for generations with far less worries, such as ours. I have been to several German cities and towns, and I agree with what you write: major German cities have large ugly parts (and a fairly beautiful historic centre - painstakingly restored I assume), but smaller towns are magnificent medieval monuments, a joy to behold and get to know.
In one such town, Rothenburg ob der Tauber, I discovered that the beauty of it was barely saved from the destruction of the war.

"Rothenburg held a special significance for Nazi ideologists. For them, it was the epitome of the German 'Home Town', representing all that was quintessentially German. Throughout the 1930s the Nazi organisation "KDF" ("Kraft durch Freude") Strength through Joy organized regular day trips to Rothenburg from all across the Reich. This initiative was staunchly supported by Rothenburg's citizenry – many of whom were sympathetic to National Socialism – both for its economic benefits and because Rothenburg was hailed as "the most German of German towns". In October 1938 Rothenburg expelled its Jewish citizens, much to the approval of Nazis and their supporters across Germany.[2]

In March 1945 in World War II, German soldiers were stationed in Rothenburg to defend it. On March 31, bombs were dropped over Rothenburg by 16 planes, killing 39 people and destroying 306 houses, six public buildings, nine watchtowers, and over 2,000 feet (610 m) of the wall. The U.S Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy knew about the historic importance and beauty of Rothenburg, so he ordered US Army General Jacob L. Devers not use artillery in taking Rothenburg. The local military commander Major Thömmes ignored the order of Adolf Hitler for all towns to fight to the end and gave up the town, thereby saving it from total destruction by artillery. American troops of the 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Division occupied the town on April 17, 1945, and in November 1948 McCloy was named Honorable Protectorate of Rothenburg. After the war, the residents of the city quickly repaired the bombing damage. Donations for the rebuilding were received from all over the world. The rebuilt walls feature commemorative bricks with donor names."

[ame=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rothenburg_ob_der_Tauber]Rothenburg ob der Tauber - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia[/ame]

Though the town was evidently a Nazi-phile, and a symbol to the regime, I am quite happy that it was spared and it was only the ideology that was demolished.

avon · Feb 13, 2012

Nice post, Solidaire!

CuriousHistorian · Feb 13, 2012

diddyriddick said:
While I will grant that the Norden bombsight wasn't all that it was cracked up to be, I'm not sold. The RAF was bombing cities without even giving lip-service to military targets-their bombs frequently ended up miles away from their intended target. By comparison, the US Army Air Corps was bombing discreet targets that were visually identified. Perhaps you have a reliable source to support your assertion.

diddy

There is a detailed study by W.Hays Parks "Precision Bombing: Who did Which and When". He demonstrates that weather conditions in the European theatre defeated the Norden bomb sight and that USAAF daylight bombing in 1944 was no more accurate overall, and probably less accurate, than RAF Bomber Command's night bombing, which was using increasingly sophisticated blind bombing aids. The USAAF hastened the introduction of H2X, their version of the British H2S radar sight, for this reason.

He also demonstrates that the USAAF fiddled their statistics by discounting anything that missed by a mile, even though that was 25% of bombloads.

At the time of writing his paper, Hays Parks was a senior DoD counsel, decorated for his work, and a Colonel in the USMCR.

The paper was published in:

[ame="http://www.amazon.com/Airpower-Theory-Practice-Strategic-Studies/dp/0714641863/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1329158044&sr=1-1"]Amazon.com: Airpower: Theory and Practice (Strategic Studies) (9780714641867): John Gooch: Books@@AMEPARAM@@http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/410JHABKSSL.@@AMEPARAM@@410JHABKSSL[/ame]

The Bomber Command concentration on city centres was a feature of 1942, before the introduction of Gee, Oboe and H2S. That doesn't mean the RAF were not trying for large scale destruction therafter, but it is wrong to characterise attempts to hit industrial targets as mere "lip-service".

CH

diddyriddick · Feb 13, 2012

avon said:
Nice post, Solidaire!

Agreed!

diddyriddick · Feb 13, 2012

Kevinmeath said:
“There is nothing to show that the B-17’s and B-24’s were significantly more accurate in their bombing than the British Lancasters and Halifaxs. Indeed, the reality of sending large formations of bombers over Germany made the sort of precision the Americans claimed practically impossible. Often only the lead plane was equipped with the super accurate Norden bombsight, and the ones behind simply dropped their bombs at the same time as the leader, even if they were flying miles behind it at the time. Inevitably, they would fall over a wide area. As a result there was very little difference between what each air force actually did to Germany, how much damage they inflicted, how many lives they took. The Americans aimed at precise targets- and devastated whole cities in the process. The RAF devastated whole cities to be sure of destroying strategic targets The main difference was largely semantic but the American position had one main advantage – by claiming precision bombing and dissociating themselves from the taint of area bombing, the Eighth Air Force stayed out of the bitter moral argument that would eventually engulf the RAF and Bomber Command”

Taken from ‘TAIL-END CHARLIES The Last Battles of the Bomber War’ pg 95-96 by John Nichol and Tony Rennell

This source merely echoes your assertion without any verifiable data.

Kevinmeath said:
“ The Americans had entered the war convinced that
they would bomb specific industrial targets visually, from high altitude bombers flying in self-defending groups. But like the British, the Americans found themselves making significant wartime modifications to their prewar bombing doctrine. Cloudy north European weather often negated the aid of the much-hyped Norden bombsight, preventing the Americans from being able to deliver the kind of precision strikes they had counted on making. A conference on bombing accuracy held in March 1945 would reveal that when the Eighth Air Force bombed through the omnipresent heavy cloud cover in the winter of 1944-45, 42 per cent of bombs fell
more than five miles from their target.

In order to maintain a reasonable operating tempo the Americans had taken to frequent attacks on railway marshaling yards—large, visible targets either inside of, or on the outskirts of major cities. Though such raids were designated and recorded as attacks on “communications” or “transportation” targets, they were often—in their effects—hard to distinguish from area raids. The Americans included incendiary
bombs in the ordnance mix for bombers flying these raids since they could cause widespread collateral damage and raise the likelihood of broad destruction and disruption for targets shrouded in cloud. The target category “marshaling yards” received more of the Eighth’s bomb tonnage than any other; indeed, more than a quarter of all the Eighth Air Force bombs dropped over Europe fell on marshaling yards. As historian Richard Davis has pointed out, “Large numbers of planes scattering their
bombs around their mostly unseen and unverifiable aiming points surely would cause great collateral damage to any soft structures located nearby.”

Even though the Americans strongly preferred to strike specific industrial
sites (and flew to those whenever weather permitted), the bulk of their raids through cloud were, in essence, area raids. In order to distinguish their efforts from those of the British, however, the Americans continued to use language that depicted them as “precision” bombing of specific military targets. The insistence on this particular language reflected ongoing American sensitivities about the ethical questions raised by strategic bombing. But the limited impact of aerial bombing
had caused the Americans no end of frustration during the war. In January 1945 Gen. Arnold had openly expressed his dismay over the failure of bombing to halt Germany in its tracks. He told Gen. Spaatz that despite a five-to-one superiority in the air, and “in spite of all our hopes, anticipations, dreams and plans, we have as yet not been able to capitalize to the extent which we should.”
Taken from.
‘Dresden 1945: Reality, History, and Memory’ by Tami Davis Biddle The Journal of Military History, Volume 72, Number 2, April 2008,
pp. 413-450

There are two problems here, the second rising from the first. The 8th Air Force didn't bomb through cloud cover all the time. Your source implies that they did. I would be interested to see specific data on exactly how often they did bomb through cloud cover. And what raises the second question is the 8th AF's SOP. Whenever a mission was dispatched, the fliers were given a primary target. In the event of overcast, they were also given secondary and tertiary targets. If those too were covered, then they were to abort the mission.

"When the 303rd BG (H) crews proceeded to their target, they discovered solid cloud
cover. The aircraft returned to Molesworth without dropping their bombs when the lead aircraft was unable to locate the target."

http://www.303rdbg.com/missionreports/001.pdf

"On this mission the 303rd BG(H) was the only Group to attack the target. The others--the 91st, the 305th, the 306th (B-17s), and the 93rd (B-24s)--could not find the target because of the solid cloud
cover."

http://www.303rdbg.com/missionreports/003.pdf

"The primary target was Romilly-sur-Seine. It was clouded over and Rouen was bombed on the way home."

http://www.303rdbg.com/missionreports/006.pdf

CuriousHistorian said:
diddy

There is a detailed study by W.Hays Parks "Precision Bombing: Who did Which and When". He demonstrates that weather conditions in the European theatre defeated the Norden bomb sight and that USAAF daylight bombing in 1944 was no more accurate overall, and probably less accurate, than RAF Bomber Command's night bombing, which was using increasingly sophisticated blind bombing aids. The USAAF hastened the introduction of H2X, their version of the British H2S radar sight, for this reason.

He also demonstrates that the USAAF fiddled their statistics by discounting anything that missed by a mile, even though that was 25% of bombloads.

At the time of writing his paper, Hays Parks was a senior DoD counsel, decorated for his work, and a Colonel in the USMCR.

The paper was published in:

Amazon.com: Airpower: Theory and Practice (Strategic Studies) (9780714641867): John Gooch: Books

The Bomber Command concentration on city centres was a feature of 1942, before the introduction of Gee, Oboe and H2S. That doesn't mean the RAF were not trying for large scale destruction therafter, but it is wrong to characterise attempts to hit industrial targets as mere "lip-service".

CH

That book is not available in my library system. All I've been able to find on Hays is that he's a lawyer. Perhaps you could share some of the pertinent data.

Bloodandsteel · Feb 13, 2012

"There is a detailed study by W.Hays Parks "Precision Bombing: Who did Which and When". He demonstrates that weather conditions in the European theatre defeated the Norden bomb sight and that USAAF daylight bombing in 1944 was no more accurate overall, and probably less accurate, than RAF Bomber Command's night bombing,"

Well it's kinda easy to hit a burning city.

Pomeroy41144 · Feb 13, 2012

Garry_Owen said:
This is a history forum for the discussion of things past. The Second World War is not sufficiently far back into the past to history. It still has a foot in current affairs.

Much of what we know about the war has been scripted by the Allied victors who have not released all of the state papers relating to its events. In other words, a better and clearer picture of the war is only now emerging from the secrecy of classified government archives.

Let us do the very opposite of what you suggest! Let us re-examine all that happened in the light of our fuller knowledge of what actually happened and why.

Yes. Here here.

It is a wonderful time to be WWII hsitorian.

I spent the last several years studying documents that were declassified in 1996. This is just the beginning--There are many documents now coming out of hiding after 70 years. I am going to post some long lost photos related to an historic event on an aviation web site in the near future. Had the original documents not been declassified, the photos would still be unknown.

Yes, it is a wonderful time to be a WWII historian.

Kevinmeath · Feb 13, 2012

diddyriddick said:
This source merely echoes your assertion without any verifiable data..............................

Wiki says

"USAAF leaders firmly held to the claim of "precision bombing" of military targets for much of the war, and dismissed claims they were simply bombing cities. However the American Eighth Air Force received the first [ame="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H2X_radar"]H2X radar[/ame] sets in December 1943. Within two weeks of the arrival of these first six sets, the Eighth command gave permission for them to area bomb a city using H2X and would continue to authorize, on average, about one such attack a week until the end of the war in Europe.[145]
In reality, the day bombing was "precision bombing" only in the sense that most bombs fell somewhere near a specific designated target such as a railway yard. Conventionally, the air forces designated as "the target area" a circle having a radius of 1000 feet around the aiming point of attack. While accuracy improved during the war, Survey studies show that, in the over-all, only about 20% of the bombs aimed at precision targets fell within this target area.[146] In the fall of 1944, only seven percent of all bombs dropped by the Eighth Air Force hit within 1,000 feet of their aim point."

Strategic bombing during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

They direct you to the 'United States Strategic Bombing Survey' but can not track a copy down. There are summaries on the net.

redcoat · Feb 13, 2012

beorna said:
Oh references that it was done i can find by my own. But as I said, no source that really did it, like the Churchill cable, the Bomber directive, Hitler's directive. why? I suppose you want me to dig, because such declaration does not exist.

To be honest, its an irrelevance to our discussion

The mere fact that the Yugoslavian government had to 'claim' that in order to prosecute the officer who ordered the raid that the city that the city had been declared an 'Open City', actually reinforces the fact that the bombing of cities was in itself not considered a war crime.

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Bombing of German cities during World War II

Was the strategic bombing of German cities during World War II justified?

The bombing of cities is a normal strategy of warfare, irrespective of who started the war.

It was totally justified, because Germany started the war.

It was justified as a means of retaliation, since Germany also bombed cities.

Although morally ambiguous today, the bombing should not be judged with today’s standards.

It may have been legitimate in the beginning, but should have been stopped later on in the war.

It was morally wrong from the beginning, no matter what crimes were committed by Germany.

I am undecided.

Garry_Owen

diddyriddick

diddyriddick

Kevinmeath

Bloodandsteel

Kevinmeath

Spartacuss

Bloodandsteel

Bloodandsteel

Bloodandsteel

diddyriddick

Solidaire

avon

CuriousHistorian

diddyriddick

diddyriddick

Bloodandsteel

Pomeroy41144

Kevinmeath

redcoat

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